

JPRS-EER-92-090  
14 JULY 1992



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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JPRS PER-92-090

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### DUMA Discloses Espionage Against Bulgaria

AU0907073792 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 24 Jun 92 pp 1, 8

[DUMA PRESS report: "Espionage Against Bulgaria Is Not a James Bond Story, but the Simple Truth"]

[Text] *The special services of Balkan countries are well established in our country, according to a document, portions of which we are publishing.*

The Turkish National Intelligence Service [MIT] has recruited as agents several Bulgarian National Assembly deputies, who are the major sources of intelligence about Bulgaria. In addition to the residents under diplomatic cover, MIT can rely on regional coordinators from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], local mayors, township secretaries and councillors, civil servants, members of public organizations, journalists, private businessmen, and others. This is stated in a document drafted by a high-ranking Bulgarian civil servant. The document is in the possession of the DUMA editorial board, which intends to submit a copy of it to the Parliamentary Commission on National Security and then to the chief prosecutor. For understandable reasons, in publishing the following details on the actions of foreign intelligence services in Bulgaria, we deliberately omitted specific classified figures and facts likely to affect our country's national security. They are contained in the original document, which covers the period from November 1991 to April 1992.

The document in question points out that MIT, in its operational plans and analytical report for 1992, defines the Balkans as a zone of exceptional and "legitimate" Turkish interests. The intelligence departments that are engaged in subversive actions against Bulgaria and the other Balkan countries are instructed to concentrate their priorities on collecting and evaluating intelligence information on the development of Balkan events, on the EC member-countries' direct interference in such events, and on the situation in the mid-Asian republics of the former USSR. The document states that espionage against Bulgaria continues to represent a major part of the Turkish secret services' activities.

The interests of Turkish intelligence are extensive. In the political sphere, their interest concentrates on the activities of parliament, the government, and the president; on obtaining documents about them; and on the drafting and implementation of the Republic of Bulgaria's new foreign policy initiatives. Facts and data on the most active political figures and the country's administration, on the shortcomings and weaknesses of the system, and on all sorts of documents and facts likely to discredit the country are being collected. Particular attention is being devoted to relations within the Union of Democratic Forces-DPS [SDS-DPS] coalition. The behavior of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the extraparlimentary opposition is also being observed. Opportunities are examined for the possible destabilization of the regime, or for a coup with the participation of the opposition forces. The state of the DPS, the existence of conflicts and contradictions in its leadership, details about corruption, and other things are also part of MIT's interest in our country.

The Turkish spies are devoting particular attention to events in the military sphere and to the state of national security in Bulgaria. They are interested in both purely

military data about specific subjects as well as in the state and development prospects of our military-industrial complex. They are also collecting information about the status of military personnel and about the various branches of service, such as the border guard troops, investigation departments, intelligence, and counterintelligence. Attention is also being devoted to the activities of retired or dismissed former Ministry of Internal Affairs or Defense Ministry functionaries who are now employed by private companies and organizations that have links to Turkey.

Ample information about economic and social affairs in our country is collected under a separate cover. The restoration of the *vakif* [Turkish word meaning real estate or other forms of property bequeathed to mosques or other Islamic institutions] properties within their original borders is another sphere that has attracted MIT's particular attention. Such efforts are complemented by practical actions of collecting information and documents, proving the ownership of the properties with the assistance of local muftis and religious communities, the document points out. It also provides details on cases of the Turkish intelligence services trying to recruit Bulgarian citizens as spies and on the reaction of Bulgarian counterintelligence.

The National Intelligence Service of Greece [EIP] and the country's military intelligence service are also well represented in Bulgaria, the document points out. Greek intelligence is concerned about the staffs and activities of high-ranking state institutions, the influence and social basis of major political parties, data on party leaders and activists, opportunities for recruiting them on the grounds of personal problems likely to make them susceptible to blackmail, and so forth.

Bulgaria's current foreign policy, especially the development of our stand on the "Republic of Macedonia" problem and the Yugoslav crisis, are the focus of the Greek espionage's attention. Information is being collected on the activities of the DPS and its influence in southeast and south-central Bulgaria and on the activities of local DPS mayors. The situation in the Blagoevgrad region—namely, the manifestations of pro-Macedonian organizations and anti-Turkish movements, and the situation of the Karakachan population [group of people, mostly cattle breeders, in mountainous regions of the Balkan Peninsula who speak the Greek or Romanian languages or a mixture of Greek and Romanian]—in Bulgaria, and so forth, are also subjects of interest for Greek intelligence. Several portions in the document are devoted to data and facts in the military, economic, and social spheres that are particularly attracting the attention of the Greek special services.

In addition to their residents, the Greek intelligence services are relying on agents and confidants among Bulgarian citizens—military personnel, journalists, and so forth.

Regardless of Yugoslavia's disintegration, the intelligence services of our western neighbor are pursuing their activities, the document reads. They continue to collect military, political, and economic information about our country. The situation in the Blagoevgrad area—processes and trends—the activities of the central leadership and local organizations of the Ilinden All-Macedonian Organization, the Vardar Macedonia Associations, the Internal Macedonian

Revolutionary Organization-Union of Macedonian Societies [VMRO-SMD], and other such organizations, as well as the financial and material assistance they receive, and the political leadership of the Ilinden Organization are the chief tasks of Yugoslav intelligence in Bulgaria. The purpose of these activities is to revive Macedonian nationalism and to recognize the status of a national minority in the territory of the Pirin region likely to facilitate an annexation of this area with the Republic of Macedonia whenever a favorable opportunity emerges. As in the cases of the other neighboring countries, Yugoslav intelligence, in addition to its residents, uses the services of recruited Bulgarian citizens, especially members of the intelligentsia.

The Romanian special services are not sleeping, either. Bulgarian ecological problems, especially in the area of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, military questions, the situation of the Vlakh [ethnic Romanian] population, and so forth are among the priorities of Romanian intelligence. Only the Albanian secret services seem to restrict their

activities to the collection of general political and socioeconomic data about the situation in our country, with an accent on the Bulgarian model of peaceful transition, according to the document.

After analyzing the Balkan countries' intelligence activities in Bulgaria, the authors of the document conclude that, irrespective of the developing democratic processes and of detente in the bilateral relations of most Balkan countries over the past two years, the Balkan region remains an area of instability, under the influence of the Yugoslav crisis and as a result of the revival of traditional controversies stemming from historical events. This also explains the unrelenting intelligence activities of the Balkan countries' special services directed against Bulgaria.

However, the application of investigative and legal measures would be expedient only as long as it does not involve negative results for Bulgaria's prestige and international reputation, according to the document.



## Czech Coalition Negotiations Studied

### KDU-CSL Demands

92CH0693A Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 20 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, by David Prudky; place and date not given: "Chairman of the KDU-CSL, Josef Lux, on Topical Problems: Astonishing Pace"]

[Text] Due to its transformation and move toward the right of the political spectrum, the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) is one of the potential coalition partners of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the winners in the elections in the Czechoslovak Republic. Following several talks between the two parties, the chairman of the KDU-CSL, Josef Lux, expressed his opinion on this issue during and after a briefing.

[Prudky] How have the coalition talks between your party and the ODS/KDS [Civic Democratic Party-Christian Democratic Party] gone so far, and what are the results?

[Lux] After the first meetings, it has become clear that there will be some problems. We are attempting to ensure that no political party will be able to form power blocs, for instance by staffing both the federal and republican Ministries of the Interior in conjunction with the Czech Ministry of Control. It would create the appearance of some development that would be difficult to predict.

For instance, the ODS's idea that it will occupy 13 seats in the 25-member CNR [Czech National Council] is unacceptable to us. We believe that, just as we can fill over half the seats in the general assembly of the CNR together, we can also create a majority on its board together.

So far we have agreed on one of our representatives to be one of the five Czech representatives in the Federal Government; on the CNR level we are striving to have Jan Kasal become its first vice chairman, and Mr. Vyborný to become the chairman of the constitutional-legal committee. As far as the Czech government is concerned, there are preliminary agreements on three of our representatives, and this should be finalized on Monday. We are attempting to create a pluralistic democratic system and we believe that this goal is more important than the fight for seats in the ministry.

[Prudky] Which specific seats would you like to have and to what extent is this compatible with the anticipated reduction in the Czech government?

[Lux] The issue of reducing the government is connected with the one-fifth proportion to which we have already agreed, i.e. one-fifth for us, one for the ODA [Civic Democratic Alliance] and three-fifths for the ODS-KDS. One issue in the talks is the importance of the individual departments. If the KDS has any reservations because the number of our seats does not correspond with the number of mandates, we do not believe that, if the coalition is to come into existence, this can be achieved on the basis of calculating a percentage representation of votes, rather the importance of the seats must be taken into consideration. In other words, if the ODS-KDS were to consider pure mathematical calculations, it could go on calculating for ever.

We will not agree with the ODS representing all three key departments if it should staff the Ministry of Control and both Ministry of the Interior departments. If it were to come to this kind of setup, we will advocate present Deputy Minister Kabat, attorney, for this position. As far as the program is concerned, naturally we are interested in the social and agricultural policies.

[Prudky] If you do not agree that the ODS should occupy 13 of the 25 seats on the CNR board, what proportion would you propose, and why is the ODS's request unacceptable?

[Lux] In contrast to the leadership of the FS [Federal Assembly], the CNR board is the collective president of the CR [Czech Republic], it appoints and dismisses the government, ministers, prosecutors, judges, etc. From this perspective, we believe it is mandatory that, since the opinion of the KDU and ODA is necessary to pass laws in the CNR general assembly, it should also be mandatory on the board. Thirteen votes are sufficient to pass any decree, and therefore we want the decision to be made in the CNR board room and not in the conference room across the street on Snemovna Street. We have suggested the proportion 12, 5, 5, 1, 1, 1 or 11, 4, 4, 2, 2, 2 (the last three numbers apply to the CSSD [Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party], LSU [Liberal Social Union], and HSU-SMS [Movement for Independent Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia]).

[Prudky] The question of your party's solidarity has been raised in connection with your member Richard Sacher, who supported the Left Bloc in the election campaign, and his possible candidacy for the office of president. Is there not the danger of a schism in its ranks?

[Lux] We invited Mr. Sacher as well as others who had actively supported other parties in the election to think about their political positions and to leave our party voluntarily.

The statewide government and the board agree with our course of action. Naturally some of our members may have a different opinion about our party's position in the political spectrum, but I do not consider this to be anything unusual. There are differences in opinions in all political parties, I do not consider their opinion to be significant. There is no danger of a schism in our party.

### ODS Reaction

92CH0693B Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 20 Jun 92 p 3

[Commentary by Jaroslav Kafka: "A Play for the Interior"]

[Text] Yesterday the KDU-CSL [Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party] expressed its apprehensions that the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] will have too dominant a position in the Czech government and the Czech parliament. Among other things, the People's Party did not like the fact that the ODS, which won a clear victory in the elections, wanted both the federal and republican departments of the Ministry of the Interior. The People's Party in the Czech government is demanding the departments of Labor and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of the Interior. There is no objection to the first two areas. Considering the KSU-CSL's program, staffing these ministries with members of this party would be natural.

However, the Ministry of the Interior is another story. The voters will certainly clearly remember the controversy around Richard Sacher, who was elevated to head the Federal Ministry of the Interior by this same Czechoslovak People's Party during the last parliamentary elections. His infamous activities in this office where, among other things, screening documents mysteriously appeared or disappeared, finally ended in his dismissal from the ministry seat. In the elections this year, R. Sacher ran as an independent candidate for the Left Bloc. The old, ever closer, friendly relations between R. Sacher and Vladimir Meciar are also no secret.

KDU-CSL did not distance itself from the activities of R. Sacher until yesterday, when it timidly requested that he think about his political position and leave the party voluntarily. In this context, it is not a very auspicious fact that the Civic Movement was much more decisive in regard to Czech government minister Jaroslav Sabata's contacts with V. Meciar, and threw him out of its ranks. It is to be expected that Mr. Sacher has the sympathies of some of the members of the KDU-CSL. In such a situation, the possibility that the CR Ministry of the Interior will be entrusted to this party is not very fortuitous.

### Slovak Federalists Criticize HZDS

#### Ambiguity Viewed

92CH0689A Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak  
15 Jun 92 p 3

[Commentary by Igor Konka: "What Is It That Is Actually Involved Here?"]

[Text] The logic of the leaders of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] regarding the constitutional arrangement is incomprehensible on the one hand and yet completely transparent on the other hand.

To start with, there is a citation of the first point of the 10-point election program of the HZDS. "By a democratic and legitimate method, bring the emancipation development of Slovakia to culmination: Proclaim the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, adopt the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, strive to achieve international legal subjectivity, and proclaim a referendum on sovereignty and on a new arrangement regarding the relationship with the Czech Republic."

In other words, first proclaim the sovereignty of Slovakia, achieve independence and international law subjectivity for the Slovak Republic. This means smashing the common state which includes the Czech Republic and, as an independent entity under international law, as an independent sovereign state, arranging relationships with the Czech Republic as its neighbor. This is nothing more than arranging relationships with other neighboring states. This is how the actual status of things looks. The intention of the referendum is then totally unclear. That is why it must be held as soon as possible and contain an unambiguously formulated question: A joint state or an independent Slovakia?

At the very least it is unfair, it is tying up the public, it is a calculation involving ignorance if the leaders of the HZDS (based on selections from a press conference held on 11 June 1992) say, in the same breath, that the program says nothing about disintegration of the state, but that they have a

mandate to arrange a free union of two sovereign republics, that their goal is not the breakup of the state, but a change in the constitutional arrangement; and yet, their program does call for Slovakia to become an entity under international law. Yes, they do have a mandate. But why do they not say openly that this must be preceded by the disintegration of the federation? Then they could negotiate with anyone, even with the Czech Republic, regarding some kind of freer associations—unions. But a free union is not a state formation, it is not a common state, it is only a method of a certain type of coexistence with one's neighbor.

In summarizing these facts, we are left with a solitary explanation; this is a case of deliberate disinformation of the citizenry and a case of juggling unambiguously defined concepts. They simply persuaded the voters that they have no intention of destroying the state, but only of modifying its relationships. And their election platform, which they are now implementing, is the opposite of the truth. They want to create a common state even though they do not admit to it openly and publicly. They are counting on seeing to it that the blame stays on the Czech side.

### Economic Concepts Scored

92CH0689B Bratislava TELEGRAF in Slovak  
17 Jun 92 p 3

[Commentary by Jozef Kucerak: "Two Personalities, Two Worlds"]

[Text] The victorious Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] has not yet entered governmental and parliamentary structures, but its attitudes toward journalists, toward federal television, toward President Havel and its attitudes in the negotiations with the ODS [Civic Democratic Party] already show samples of its future actions, not only in the political arena, but also in the economic sphere.

Some days ago, Meciar was justifying his resistance to economic reforms by pointing out that Slovakia is on the verge of economic catastrophe. However, his inconspicuous remark that the road to Slovak independence will result temporarily in major economic difficulties went virtually unnoticed.

According to recent official statistics, the increase in prices has virtually stopped, the number of unemployed has declined, there are signs of economic revitalization. The balance of trade is unexpectedly favorable. Confidence in the stability of the koruna [Kcs] is showing up also in an increase of savings deposits by the population. The balanced rate of the koruna has made it possible for citizens to purchase a constantly growing quantity of foreign exchange. It was anticipated that the limit of these purchases will be increasing constantly.

In this situation, the HZDS is skating on thin ice. When Meciar claims that, despite visible signs of economic revitalization, the federally conceived reforms will lead to a collapse of the Slovak economy and that only the complete jurisdiction of the Slovak government will be a saving factor, he will have a difficult time justifying to the citizens of Slovakia why he is offering them a deterioration in the standard of living in the event Slovakia becomes independent. After all, his government would, finally, hold all economic jurisdictions in its hands!

He could prevail before his voters only in the event he could shift the blame for the economic difficulties resulting from a possible disintegration of the state to the Czech side, onto the "Klaus followers." He is therefore developing feverish activity in an effort to convince the public that Klaus is inflexible with respect to the variation of economic coexistence according to the HZDS model.

Except that the public, particularly the world public (and it is the latter that is decisive in forming attitudes with respect to a future independent Slovakia) knows that the negotiations between Klaus and Meciar are not a simple clash of two personalities, but of two equivalent concepts. It is a clash between two worlds, in which the first one must not yield to the second if it does not wish to step backward several decades. Klaus is backed by the philosophy of modern civilizations with their economic and political freedoms; Meciar is backed by the musty ideologies of reform socialism; Klaus is backed by a modesty modeled on the experiences of mature countries; Meciar is backed by ambitious speculations regarding specific Slovak ways of economic development; Klaus is backed by the wisdom of the experiences of societies in developed nations; Meciar is backed by the naivete of socialist experimenters with the fate of citizens. Klaus is backed by the concepts of modern pragmatic economists, such as Dyba, Zielenec, Svejnar, Kocarnik; Meciar is backed by the victorious older team of "sixty-eighters"—Kovac, Kocuch, Lalah, Kontr, Filkus.

(Only the last of these individuals has crossed the horizon of these ceremonial HZDS economic leaders and that is why, from a standpoint of economic content and terminology, the leader of the movement himself, Meciar, is promoting him so specifically.)

In an effort to radicalize the position of the Czech side with respect to Slovakia and to hasten the process from which Slovakia is supposed to emerge as abandoned and cast off by the Czechs, Meciar is using the nerve-rattling tactic of deferring negotiations and, at the same time, he is putting the chess pieces into play on the chessboard of Moravia and Bohemia. The moves by Sabata and Sacher are reminiscent of a hazardous game which contains the threat that Slovaks will also make incursions into Bohemia. Sacher, who, at the end of 1990, for unclear reasons and based on uncertain sources provided Meciar with an emolument for Slovakia and who, recently, standing alongside Meciar condemned lustrations, would be more acceptable to Meciar than President Havel, not to mention the Svoboda Communists who might find understanding for their ideas through collaborating with Meciar in Bohemia, in contrast to Klaus.

The Czechs will surely find a way not to devalue the results of their elections. And once this game is finished, Slovakia will probably return to finish the previous game of the 1960's.



**Compensation Limited for Former Regime Damage**

92CH0677A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 26 May 92 p 13

[Interview with State Secretary Tamas Sepsey, chairman of the National Claims and Compensation Office, by Gabor Deregan; place and date not given: "Grievances Can Be Redressed Only in Part"]

[Text] *The legislation period of the so-called major compensation laws has come to an end with parliament's latest decision to enact the law on compensating victims of political persecution. Parliament attempted to redress the injuries of the past 50 years related to loss of property, freedom, and life. How does State Secretary Dr. Tamas Sepsey, chairman of the National Claims and Compensation Office, view this, and what is the reason for the bill's somewhat cautious wording—which was also mentioned during the debate on the third compensation bill?*

[Sepsey] The reason for it is that it is impossible to entirely redress these grievances. Parliament fulfilled its historic mission of assessing half a century's horrors, providing compensation within the given financial possibilities, and offering an apology to the victims. However, parliament will have to legislate one more, very significant law that is partly connected to compensation, namely, the so-called law of national care allowance. Even during the last debate, several representatives called attention to the fact that the laws that have been enacted so far do not cover the victims of all injuries. The lawmakers reviewed the above-mentioned period's entire history of distress, and will attempt to compensate those who are not affected by the present statutes through the law on national care allowance. The general debate on the bill has already begun, and a decision is expected before the end of the summer session.

[Deregan] Who will be affected by this statute?

[Sepsey] Those who, with no legal process, lost their lives or became disabled during the 1944 fascist atrocities and the 1956 revolution, and certain members of their families. Another legislation, which will affect relatively few people, is expected; it will provide financial compensation for those, i.e., members of the families of those, who lost their lives as a result of criminal activities, and wherein the state failed to bring legal charges. The third compensation law, passed last week, requires the administration to present this new bill. Of course, new questions may arise during the implementation of these statutes.

[Deregan] During the past one or one and a half years, mostly a partial compensation was mentioned. Why?

[Sepsey] Partial compensation was emphasized even in the ministry's justification for property compensation, for millions of citizens suffered injuries throughout the past decades, and there are no ways and means to fully compensate them. Unfortunately, precisely for this reason the nation is unable to compensate at all many persons, e.g., those who suffered losses because of bombings during the war. There are people who still have the so-called requisition vouchers, and they cannot be compensated either. Nor can those who lost their jobs after 1945 or later, were put on the B-list, or were denied admission to a university because of political reasons. These people were deprived of certain

means of earning a livelihood—there were hundreds of thousands of them—and their material losses are evident. Moreover, the Hungarian compensation laws exclude those who, for various reasons, were forced to relocate from upper northern Hungary or Transylvania.

[Deregan] The first law on material compensation went into effect on 10 August 1991. What is your opinion on how those who benefited from its provisions received it?

[Sepsey] The overwhelming majority acknowledges the intentions of the country, parliament, and the administration; I believe the figures are decisive in this respect: 830,000 persons requested material compensation and, to date, more than 330,000 persons filed claims for supplementary pensions. When a person "replies" to a law, he or she automatically accepts it. The sensible majority of people is also aware of the country's present economic condition.

[Deregan] There are those who hold the absence of reprivatization—the return of all former property—a crime of the administration....

[Sepsey] They, too, know well what transformations in value and ownership former property went through during the 1950's. Factories and expressways stand where there were fields, and factories, shops, and houses were torn down, rebuilt, or used for other purposes. Reprivatization would have meant not compensation but indemnity, totaling many thousands of billions [currency not specified]. No budget exists in the world that could undertake such a burden. For this reason, the Hungarian legislation of compensation provides compensation in the most sensible way: Everyone is compensated the same way, with compensation vouchers. Land property is the only exception where the former owner may repossess his former property through auctions.

[Deregan] The timing of the legislation was also questioned. Some speak of certain delays. What is your opinion on this?

[Sepsey] I would say that, after the political restructuring, the compensation laws were on parliament's priority list. To provide compensation, the country's economy had to be put in order, for what can laws accomplish if they only promise—compensation in the present case—but do not deliver? The review of property and personal grievances took an extraordinary amount of time and effort. One should not overlook parliament's burdens and responsibilities either. I would add a comment to all this: In Spain, the process of compensation was closed in the 15th year of restructuring. Thus, parliament or the administration can hardly be reproached for any delay.

**Debate Over Proposal To Disband MSZMP**

92CH0674A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
21 May 92 p 7

[Interview with independent representative Karoly Eke, member of both the previous and the present parliaments, by Lajos Pogonyi; place and date not given: "Karoly Eke: The Independents, Too, Are Divided"]

[Text] [Pogonyi] Mr. Eke, you must be familiar with the Hungarian law now in effect concerning political parties.

[Eke] Yes, of course I am familiar with it.

[Pogonyi] Well then you must also be aware of the fact that in Hungary only a court is authorized to register, alternatively, to ban or disband parties if they endeavor to acquire power by force or intend to acquire exclusive power. In contrast, you are one of the few representatives—32 to be exact—who voted for your fellow independent representative's, Janos Denes', proposal. Based on that proposal the National Assembly should declare the disbanding of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party [MSZMP] and the use of its assets for public purposes. Although I know that you have been an independent politician for a long time, don't you think it is odd that a majority of not even the members of the ruling parties identified themselves with Mr. Denes' proposal?

[Eke] I did not vote for any proposal advanced by Janos Denes that would urge the disbanding of a party.

[Pogonyi] But instead?

[Eke] I voted for the National Assembly to place the proposal on the agenda. I have advised Mr. Denes from the beginning to go to court with an issue like that. My fellow representative, on the other hand, has certain data in his possession that he wanted to present to parliament. This is what he said, at least.

[Pogonyi] Could it be that you, too, are aware of such data?

[Eke] No, but I am very curious to see the data. This is why I voted aye, so that parliament could hear this allegedly existing information in closed session. I do not regard as odd that many voted nay to Janos Denes' proposal; what I think is odd that my fellow representative has no way of reporting the information he mentioned he had in his possession, which, in his view, would fall under the purview of parliament. Acquiescence will never come about unless we candidly present the issues. I am in favor of broad publicity. The cases must be closed.

[Pogonyi] What is the meaning of Janos Denes' statement, i.e., that the MSZMP is "dishonest, and that it acquires property through criminal action"? A strict financial audit of the parties has not revealed any kind of criminal dealing by the MSZMP, after all.

[Eke] This is precisely the issue Janos Denes wanted to talk about, but he did not have an opportunity to do so. Thus I am unable to comment on the case. This is exactly like the Bos-Nagymaros problem that was discussed in its own days in secret session. I believe that we are still not fully aware of everything that is involved in the power plant construction. Simply put: The MSZMP issue should also be clarified.

[Pogonyi] What is the actual issue?

[Eke] You should raise this question to Janos Denes.

[Pogonyi] But you supported the proposal whose title mentioned the word "banning."

[Eke] I repeat: I supported the idea of placing the proposal on the agenda.

[Pogonyi] Mr. Eke, do you believe that the proposal concerning the MSZMP is the most urgent issue in Hungary today?

[Eke] This should be decided by parliament and by the rest of the parties. As an independent representative I do not feel authorized to speak for any of the parties regarding this issue.

[Pogonyi] I am interested in your view....

[Eke] I will state my view when the proposal is placed on parliament's agenda.

[Pogonyi] In the previous parliament you were a representative outside of the party, the chairman of the independent group. Had it not occurred to you at that time to place on the agenda the issue of disbanding the MSZMP?

[Eke] In the previous parliament I chaired the committee that began establishing personal responsibility in the plain view of the country. Even at that time I believed that all issues had to be clarified on a personal basis. The idea of disbanding the MSZMP had not occurred to me because the committee I chaired heard testimony from only 14 people. We needed further evidence, the finding of interrelationships, but meanwhile the mandate of parliament expired. We were not able to close a single case.

[Pogonyi] As an independent politician you have gained a tremendous amount of experience during the past seven years. Don't you think it is odd that Prime Minister Jozsef Antall sought out the independent group of representatives—or more accurately, some of the independent representatives—for the first time only two years after the opening of the new parliament? Additionally, if I am correct, you acted as the liaison between the prime minister and the invited representatives.

[Eke] I did not act as a liaison; I informed the invited representatives of the time of the meeting. I was unaware of what the head of government wanted to tell us.

[Pogonyi] Really, what did Jozsef Antall want to tell your group?

[Eke] A very important matter, notably the fact that the government, and he, personally, did not regard the independent representatives as either opposition representatives or as ruling party representatives.

[Pogonyi] This, on the other hand, contradicts the fact that a few "black sheep," as, for instance, Kata Beke and Imre Pozsgay, proved to be undesirable people, at least insofar as the meeting was concerned. The head of government made a simple distinction. I have the feeling that he wants to divide your group....

[Eke] The prime minister did not make a distinction, the group of independents is also divided. Some members of the group are committed to a party.

[Pogonyi] If you have in mind Imre Pozsgay, or the former MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] member Kata Beke, they are not members of a party, but of a movement. Some believe that the head of government needs your votes, because he had lost the ten Smallholders votes controlled by Jozsef Torgyan. By now your independent group consists of 18 representatives, and it would not hurt to divide that group somewhat.

[Eke] I emphasize that the head of government did not want to, and does not want to divide us. As long as you have mentioned my fellow representative Imre Pozsgay, he has

already announced his intention to form a party out of the National Democratic Alliance. Independence means to me the same thing today as it did before. At that time I drew a line between myself and the MSZMP, today I am drawing a line between all parties and myself. This, however, does not mean that I refuse to accept positive endeavors made by the parties. In contrast, I am in no way independent from my constituency. Prior to the meeting with the prime minister, independence had meant political weightlessness in parliament; at this time we were promised to receive first hand information. I do not feel that it is odd at all that the prime minister had not sought us out before, the important thing is that he thought of us. Not a single word had been uttered at the meeting about a need for five independent votes supportive of the government.

### Excessive Power of Regional Prefects Denied

#### Interior Ministry's View

92CH0672A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG  
in Hungarian 26 May 92 p 4

[Interview with Dr. Lajos Szabo, Local Government Division chief at the Interior Ministry, by Erzsebet Juhasz; place and date not given: "The Government's Action Is Consistent With the Law; Does the Regional Prefect Have Great Power?"]

[Text] *The question raised in the title arose in response to a recently promulgated government decree providing for certain functions of regional prefects relative to the operations of autonomous local governmental bodies. We asked Dr. Lajos Szabo, the head of the Local Government Division at the Interior Ministry, to interpret the decree.*

[Juhasz] What is your view of the objections to the decree, and is there an example in modern Western democracies for an institution similar to that of the regional prefects, and for authorities similar to those exercised by regional prefects?

[Szabo] I am very familiar with the criticisms; nevertheless, I feel that most of these are emotionally motivated or based on passions, and there is a lack of thorough knowledge regarding the professional intent of legislators. Legal institutions similar to the institution of the Hungarian regional prefect exist in virtually every developed Western democracy; their names differ in each country, e.g., they call them district or county prefects, or provincial commissioners. In the West, however, state administrative supervisors have generally more authority than what the National Assembly and the government have bestowed upon Hungarian regional prefects, as such authority has been defined in the Law Concerning the Legal Status of the Republic's Regional Prefects or in the government decree now being objected to. Insofar as I am concerned I observe the debate with great interest, and I am amazed why no newspaper article has published the fact that the authority granted to our regional prefects is virtually the weakest on a comparative international scale!

#### He Cannot Take Action

[Juhasz] Could you give some examples of the kinds of authority prefects have in other countries, and compare those with the authority of Hungarian regional prefects?

[Szabo] For example, in the Bavarian Province of Germany the state administrative supervisory authority is authorized

to obtain direct information about municipal affairs, he may review the records of local legislative bodies, and he is entitled to raise objections and to annul local actions. Moreover, in case a municipality fails to perform a duty required by law, the supervisor may obligate a municipality to act, or may commission someone to manage the affairs of that municipality, at the municipality's expense. In France, prefects have been functioning as local representatives of the state since 1982; the prefect sees to it that laws are implemented, and his office incorporates the specialized offices of ministries in a given region, as an internal organizational unit. Municipalities receive guidelines from the ministry through the prefects, and information feedback to the ministry is also channeled through the prefect. Municipalities request the prefect to comment before approving developmental plans for the settlement; the prefect also participates, for example, in the distribution of housing investment funds.

Compared to this kind of authority, the authority of the Hungarian regional prefect is substantially weaker. This flows from the liberal approach taken in the Hungarian local government law, one that does not recognize regional prefects as a supervisory authority above the local governments, and rules out the possibility of an internal, "manipulative" control over local governments. The regional prefect has four fundamental functions. First, he exercises control over the legality of actions taken by local governments. This amounts to less than a supervisory authority, because the regional prefect is not authorized to take action, he cannot annul a local decree or a determination. He is not even authorized to suspend the implementation of a local decree or determination, because his control over the legality of action takes place after the fact, and is limited to calling attention to illegality, or failing that, to the initiation of court action. Accordingly, whether a local government decree or determination violates the law is ultimately decided by the Constitutional Court or the court system. The second authority of regional prefects is the exercise of jurisdictional authority in the first instance. Characteristically, this authority is used in rare, from a professional standpoint complex cases, such as in eminent domain proceedings, and when granting mine indemnification and adoption permits. These matters do not pertain to local governmental bodies, instead they are cases to be acted upon under state administrative authority. The same applies to issues involving legal recourse.

#### Streamlining Is His Job

[Juhasz] But those who criticize the decree we mentioned before complain mostly about the other two authorities pertaining to other state administrative and coordinating functions, which, according to them, restrict the broadening of local autonomy. What is the situation in this regard?

[Szabo] These two types of authority may be traced back to the local government law, adopted by the affirmative vote of 98 percent of representatives in parliament. The local government law, however, provides only an overall framework, and insofar as state administrative functions are concerned, the framework must be "filled in" by the government. Without that, government administration could not function in a satisfactory manner. In our view, these legal provisions were prepared in due regard to the guarantees contained in the local government law, and are consistent



with those. These functions have a character of not depriving local governments from their autonomy.

[Juhasz] Specifically, what kind of authority is involved here?

[Szabo] If, for example the mitigation of an unpreventable damaging or dangerous circumstance falls under the jurisdiction of several state administrative organs, let's say, in instances when the medical officer, the water authority, the environmental supervisory authority and civil defense must act simultaneously, it is the regional prefect's function to coordinate the work of these organs. For example, if God forbid, the eels in Lake Balaton would perish as they did last year, or if the earthquake in the Balaton highlands that occurred seven years ago would reoccur, it would be hardly realistic to imagine a situation in which local governments isolated from each other could mitigate the effects in the absence of appropriate coordination. Contagious diseases do not stop at public road signs in the outskirts of villages either, instead they affect small or large regions. For this reason uniformly guided action is needed, and providing such guidance is a state administrative function. The fact that such action can only take place based on cooperative efforts by local governments is yet another matter. Having said this, we can hardly talk about excessive power or influence on the part of regional prefects, or restrictions on the autonomy of local governmental bodies....

[Juhasz] What is the situation regarding requests for documents, information, and for decisions made and resolutions brought by various bodies? Why is all this necessary?

[Szabo] This is necessary in order to render the legality of decisions controllable. In the course exercising control over the legality of action, the regional prefect may want to review resolutions brought by committees and mayors under authority delegated by the legislative body, as well as other documents needed to evaluate the legality of action. But in doing so, seeking out "intimate aspects" of decisions, such as who said what in the course of debate, is not the intent of the regional prefect, instead, he is interested only in information required to determine the legality of action, as, for example, whether a quorum existed at the session, whether the decision was based on the legally required voting ratio, and whether the substance of the decision is consistent with law.

#### No Decisionmaking Authority

[Juhasz] Has not the disputed decree given excessive power to regional prefects as a result of the streamlining role to be played, in the framework of coordinating the activities of the regional offices of various ministries?

[Szabo] This function is based on the local government law. In our view, the regional prefect did not receive new authority as a result of the decree, because insofar as the functioning of these regional offices is concerned, the regional prefect has no executive or decisionmaking authority to the detriment of the various specialized ministries. At most, one could say that the regional prefect's means to organize have been increased in order to enforce considerations of rationality and practicality from the standpoint of the populace, at the regional level. For example, the regional prefect may comment on, and make recommendations regarding the area of jurisdiction of given

client service offices of various ministries as well as regarding the location of their headquarters, in due regard to the interests of the populace. To mention an everyday example: to enable individuals to visit the offices of two different organs on the same day, and during the same office hours, relative to a case involving a gift to a minor.

[Juhasz] Many believe that the coordinating authority of regional prefects with respect to the development of settlements violates the interests of local governments, as well as the local government law itself.

[Szabo] This is not the case. The regional prefect does not interfere with the development of settlements; instead, he takes part in performing the coordinating functions of the interior minister, the functions that were assigned to the minister by the local government law, and further, in the implementation of governmental programs pertaining to regions, such as Borsod, Szabolcs, or Southern Plains regional programs. Accordingly, this legal provision is not new either, it may be traced back to the local government law. The regional prefect may arrange for mediation regarding programs that involve the development of branches of the economy and that affect local governments, i.e., his role amounts to involvement and organizing only. Under this authority the outcome of cases is not being decided, this authority does not represent a position of power, the regional prefect does not disburse funds under this authority, and this authority does not involve all the ministries, but instead, only the interior ministry. Incidentally, my view of this entire subject is that in promulgating this decree the government did no more than comply with the requirements set by the local government law. It detailed the individual functions of the regional prefect, and these do not reach to the "merits" of local government affairs. To be accurate about this: "The government directs the performance of state administrative functions and provides for the existence of conditions for the performance of these functions."

#### Regional Prefect's View

92CH0672B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
29 May 92 p 11

[Article by Dr. Peter Szentgyorgyvolgyi, Budapest regional prefect: "On the Excessive Power of Regional Prefects"]

[Text] As we have learned from the press, the government decree concerning certain functions of regional prefects, promulgated on the last day of April, evoked no small outrage by the opposition. Charges related to the government decree are as follows:

1. The decree excessively broadens the power of regional prefects.
2. The decree empowered regional prefects to perform a coordinating role with respect to the development of settlements, and thus infringed upon the autonomy of local governments.
3. Disturbance (chaos) may result if the regional prefect enters into the bipolar expo preparation process (Program Office, Budapest Expo Office) as a third party.

People who read newspapers could once again have become convinced of yet another practice pursued by the government, one that violates local governments and democracy,

of course. But if the reader reviews the government decree (No. 77 of 30 January 1992 concerning certain functions of the regional prefect) he will be amazed, because the language of the decree does not justify the above charges, even if one has the boldest, most colorful imagination.

In order to inform the reading public in several respects, I am publishing my view derived on the basis of the legal provisions, in the order the charges were made:

1.1. The decree excessively broadens the power of regional prefects.

1.2. The government decree prescribes the functions of regional prefects by using 14 different verbs. These are: provide (provide help); analyze; call upon; establish (may establish a committee); recommend; ask for; initiate; take part; render (render help); convene; bring together; streamline; inform; comment.

Further explanation would be needed to understand what kind of power one can exercise by using the verbs "providing" and "recommending." Only the verbs "call upon" and "convene" may become suspect; for this reason, and from the standpoint of examining this issue, it is appropriate to separately study these verbs in the context of the text.

If, in the course of examining the legality of a decree promulgated by a local representative body the regional prefect finds that the decree violates a law, he calls upon the representative body to discontinue the illegal situation and establishes a deadline. He does so within 60 days after receiving the minutes related to the decree. Accordingly, this provision establishes a duty for the regional prefect. The independence of the autonomous local government is not infringed upon by the call; if the local government fails to discontinue the illegal condition noted by the regional prefect, the regional prefect may take court action. Accordingly, his power amounts this: He may go to court.

In the context of the decree the verb "convene" applies to the authority of the regional prefect to convene a coordinating conference. The text presents this verb in the conditional tense. Use of the conditional tense does not provide an opportunity for the real exercise of power. On the other hand, no action can be taken by the regional prefect if no one complies with his intent to convene.

In summary, the first charge does not stand, because the government conveys no power whatsoever to regional prefects, let alone immeasurable power. Yes, it does assign additional work.

2.1. The decree empowered regional prefects to perform a coordinating role with respect to the development of settlements, and thus infringed upon the autonomy of local governments.

2.2. It is an undisputed fact that settlement development, insofar as local public service provisions are concerned, is the function, moreover duty, of local governments. There exist certain developmental projects, however, that transcend the concept of local public service provisions or the functional jurisdiction of a given local government. For example, the Lagymanyos bridge, the development of backward regions, support for investments that create workplaces, etc. For this reason the local government law directs the interior minister to determine, at the national level,

which settlement development projects that affect local government operations must be streamlined. The incriminated government decree applies this provision of the local government law at the regional level when it says that the regional prefect takes part within the area of his jurisdiction in the performance of regional coordinating tasks related to the interior minister's settlement development program.

In summary: The matters complained about in the second charge do not infringe at all upon the independence of autonomous local governmental bodies, the contents of these provisions have been derived from the earlier law that required the affirmative vote of a two-thirds majority.

3.1. Disturbance (chaos) may result if the regional prefect enters into the bipolar expo preparation process (Program Office, Budapest Expo Office) as a third party.

3.2. The preparation of the world exposition is not a bipolar matter.

The law concerning the 1996 World Exposition and a government decree promulgated on the basis of that law clearly state that the government shall be the organizer of the world exposition, and that the World Exposition Program Office shall perform the functions of the government. The realization and operation of the world exposition has countless aspects which must be resolved by state administrative organs. The local government law defines the streamlining of the activities of state administrative organs as a function of the regional prefects. The streamlining of these, and even less, a readiness to streamline can, by no means create chaos.

In summary: The regional prefect cannot cause disturbance in the preparation of the expo, as long as he performs the coordinating duty prescribed by the local government law. But coordination also means something else, beyond the streamlining function. It also means an ordering of adjunct functions, a state of being adjunct. In this sense, coordination may evoke the dislike of a person or persons who endeavor to achieve centralization, rather than an adjunct role. This tendency can be clearly seen in the practice of the Budapest local government, to the detriment of the various districts of the city.

To repeat what I have said before: None of the charges against the government decree concerning certain functions of regional prefects can be supported. To the contrary: All provisions of the government decree may be traced to the provisions of the local government law.

Dr. Peter Szentgyorgyvolgyi  
Budapest Regional Prefect

### **Military Cooperation With Sweden Sought**

92CH0649A Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET  
in Swedish 7 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Sune Olofson: "Hungary Wants Military Cooperation"]

[Text] Budapest—Hungary wants to establish defense and security policy cooperation with Sweden. The Ministry of Defense in Budapest has recently been intensifying its contacts in Stockholm. Those talks include plans for training Hungarian soldiers in Sweden.

"We are extending our hand to Stockholm," says Istvan Kormendy, head of the Security Policy Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the other hand, it is extremely doubtful that Hungary will ever buy the Swedish JAS-39 Gripen fighter plane. Hungary has an obvious shortfall in its treasury, and there is currently no political agreement on buying new aircraft.

When Andras Hajdu, Hungary's ambassador, arrived in Stockholm on 18 April 1991, his mission was to deepen and develop military and security policy relations with Sweden. That cooperation is now beginning to take concrete form.

In April of this year, the [Hungarian] Ministry of Defense's Under Secretary Erno Raffay came to Stockholm at the invitation of his counterpart Michael Sahlin. Among other things, Raffay looked at the JAS-39 Gripen at Saab Military Aircraft in Linköping, and that was where the reports that Hungary would buy the JAS got started.

A group from the [Swedish] Defense College will visit Budapest this September, and in that same month, two representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense in Budapest will come to Stockholm. The Riksdag's Defense Committee will tour Hungary in December.

#### Proposal To Be Presented

Minister of Defense Anders Björck (Moderate Party) has been invited to visit Hungary. He will probably accept, and make the trip in October. Minister of Foreign Affairs Margaretha af Ugglas made a two-day visit to Budapest in May.

"When Anders Björck comes here, we will present a proposal for bilateral military cooperation," says Colonel Gyozo Vajda, deputy chief of the Ministry of Defense's Department for International Relations.

Hungary's military attache in Finland, Karoly Madarasz, was recently accredited to Stockholm, and Sweden's military attache in Vienna, Colonel Goran Andersson, will also work in Hungary beginning this fall.

Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have been busy seeking a new security policy line, and the country [as published] is on its way to a fully developed market economy. Hungary's goal is to join the EC and the WEU [Western European Union] defense alliance, and the coalition government in Budapest has no objections to the country's becoming a member of NATO.

"We would very much like to have one foot in NATO and the other in the WEU. In fact, it was the chairman of the Socialist Party who suggested that the possibility of joining NATO be debated in parliament. One need only look at the map to realize that Hungary must be a state fully integrated with the new Europe. This is our historic chance," says Istvan Kormendy.

"In our efforts to find a new policy line, we would very much like to study the well-established defense and security policy in Sweden, a state for which we have great respect. Sweden's path into Europe is a model for us to follow."

#### Unstable Neighbors

Budapest is placing great hopes in Stockholm and Anders Björck. People are talking freely about the possibility that

Hungarian officers will study or be trained by the Swedish military. So far, Anders Björck has said only that Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland may be future markets for the Swedish defense industry.

Although officials in Budapest are very cautious when it comes to talking too specifically about the threats created for Hungary by the new situation in Europe, the crises in Romania and Yugoslavia are mentioned as reasons for Hungary to put its house in order. Almost all the defense materiel in Hungary needs to be replaced. Today the country is hardly in a position to repel even the slightest attack.

"When the Russians withdrew, they took all the modern defense materiel with them," says Csaba Kiss, head of a political section in the Ministry of Defense.

Hungary suddenly found itself with four neighboring states that are not characterized by stability and security: Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Ukraine. In addition, a large number of Hungarians live in the surrounding countries. In Romania, about 2 million Hungarians live in formerly Hungarian Transylvania. About 600,000 Hungarians live in the republic of Vojvodina in Yugoslavia, and Hungary has taken in 50,000 countrymen fleeing a collapsing Yugoslavia.

Hungary has already started modernizing its Air Force. A sum of 1.6 billion forints has been earmarked in the 1992 budget for purchasing a ground-based system for the identification of national and foreign aircraft. To put things in proportion, it can be mentioned that Hungary's defense budget totals 60 billion forints, or 1.8 percent of GNP.

"Our ambition is to modernize our old MiG airplanes or eventually to buy new aircraft. But where are we going to get the money? Naturally, we hope that the Swedish defense industry will be able to start up joint ventures here," says Gyula Janko, head of the newly established Military Industrial Office (MIO).

#### May Lease Viggen

Csaba Kiss and Gyozo Vajda rule out completely the idea that Hungary may buy the JAS.

"If we were buying, we would be more interested in the U.S. F-16," says Gyozo Vajda, who also mentions the possibility of leasing Viggen or Draken aircraft.

In September or October, the government will present a defense plan covering a longer period, and that plan may throw light on the direction Hungary will choose to follow on the aircraft issue. The country also needs armor-piercing weapons, radar systems, transport vehicles, and laser electronics.

#### Changed Rules for Foreigners Buying Real Estate

92CH0654A Budapest TOZSDE KURIR in Hungarian  
21 May 92 p 13

[Article by Ildiko Klarik and Robert Gal: "On New Rules for Foreigners Acquiring Real Property"]

[Text] An executive decree was issued recently on the acquisition of real estate by foreigners. About the events leading up to the regulation, one must know that the Constitutional Court annulled the previous 1989 executive



order effective 30 September 1990. After that time, only Article 38 of the Agrarian Bill and the regulations of the Foreign Exchange Act remained in force as normative regulations. Article 38 of the Agrarian Bill prescribes that in the absence of legislation or international agreements, foreign corporate bodies and natural persons can acquire ownership of real estate through purchase, exchange, or as a gift only with the permission of the Finance Ministry. For one and a half years, the Finance Ministry's procedure of granting permission and the criteria for evaluation were not regulated by law.

According to the executive order, the Finance Ministry will grant permission if the following conditions are met:

1. The acquisition of real estate does not violate the interests of the Hungarian state, local governments, economy, tourism, culture, welfare, or other interests of society; or
2. The real estate previously owned by the foreigner in Hungary had been nationalized; or
3. The foreigner exchanges real estate in Hungary owned by him for other real estate in Hungary; or
4. The goal of the acquisition of real estate is the division of joint property.

Based on the contents of point 1, permission can be denied if the state of which the foreigner is a national does not grant the same favor to Hungarian citizens or corporations.

If the conditions included in points 2-4 are met, permission can be denied if the acquisition of real estate violates the interests of the Hungarian state, local governments, economy, tourism, culture, welfare, or other interests of society.

The executive order, in the absence of any contradictory regulations by other provisions of law, precludes the acquisition of agricultural land and protected natural sites by foreigners.

From the point of view of the application of this provision of law, foreign private persons are all non-Hungarian citizens, with the exception of persons who possess a permanent residency permit to reside in Hungary and persons with

a refugee status. These latter private persons are allowed to acquire real estate without the permission of the Finance Ministry, but in compliance with the regulations concerning foreign exchange.

The acquisition of real estate by Hungarian citizens living abroad is not restricted by the regulations; they can acquire real estate without permission. Of course, in their case, too, one must take into consideration the regulations concerning foreign exchange.

Foreign corporations and natural persons needing permission to acquire real estate can submit their applications to the foreign exchange authority (in this case, the Central Corporation of Banking Companies, which carries out the tasks of a foreign exchange authority in the name of the Finance Ministry), or to the mayoral office of the municipal (district) local government which has jurisdiction over the real estate.

Wherever the application is submitted, the following documents must be enclosed:

- A document proving the nationality of the foreigner;
- A copy of the contract regarding the acquisition of real estate;
- A copy of the proprietorship entry from the real estate register, not more than three months old;
- A receipt for taxes and a statement of value, not more than three months old;
- A verification by the bank of the exchange of convertible currency to cover the purchase price, or of the existence of the purchase price in forints resulting from the exchange, or, in the absence of the above, a permit from the foreign exchange authority.

Decisions by the licensing authority are not subject to appeal. The possibility of legal remedy is, however, only precluded within the framework of administrative procedures. It is possible to request the revision of the decision by a court of law.

(Executive order No. 171/1991 of 27 December was published in MAGYAR KOZLONY, No. 146 of 1991.)

**Programs, Populism of Fringe Parties Criticized**

92EP0500C Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY

in Polish No 24, 14 Jun 92 p 4

[Interview with Konstanty Adam Wojtaszczyk, professor of political science, by Magdalena Grochowska; place and date not given: "A Crowd on the Stage"]

[Text] [Grochowska] Is not a country absurd in which over 20 of the 100 registered parties are grotesque and an anecdotal party succeeds in entering parliament?

[Wojtaszczyk] I must say you are right. However, this is not an isolated phenomenon. During the period of changes in other postcommunist countries, similar parties are in operation and they, too, successfully enter parliament. In the countries of Western Europe, which broke away from an authoritarian system, for example, in Spain and Portugal, parties of this type likewise were in operation. We also encounter them in states with a stabilized democracy, for example, in Great Britain the Dog Lovers Party and the Homosexual Party take part in elections. But there they are not a primary element on the political scene. In Poland, on the other hand, although such parties also do not have significant power, they add a certain informational buzz. They belong to parapolitical phenomena. Their forms of action and their goals are not typical for traditional political parties.

[Grochowska] What is atypical in them?

[Wojtaszczyk] Everything, beginning with their genesis, through their program and their activity. They arose after 1989 upon the base of other circumstances than the traditional parties. They were based upon populism (Party X), frustration, especially the frustration of intelligentsia circles, disenchantment associated with expectations for more rapid change (Party of Reason, Pragmatists Party) and, finally, the desire to actively aid the reform. The lack of a system for articulating the interests of various communities contributed to the creation of some of these parties. Organizational forms, active during the previous period, ceased their activity. On the other hand, new ways of representing economic, cultural, and other interests did not develop. In conjunction with this, various groups are organizing into political parties (for example, the VCR Lovers Party).

[Grochowska] To what extent is this proliferation of parties due to the many years of the one-party system and to what extent is it due to the phenomenon which social psychologists call compensation, i.e., the attempt by small party politicians to replace a humdrum life with a surrogate of lofty activity?

[Wojtaszczyk] I am of the opinion that both of these reasons may be taken into consideration here. At the same time, this second phenomenon appears to a lesser degree and concerns regional parties in particular. In reality, the motive for establishing them may be the desire to be seen in the local community as well as to meet the needs of camaraderie. Studies we are conducting with the students of the Warsaw University Institute of Political Science show that there are already several hundred small parties. The law provides for the activity of both registered parties and unregistered ones. The latter do not have legal status, but they are legal organizations. Many of them operate in individual centers

and, to return to your initial statement about reacting to the one-party system, they perform that function beneficially.

[Grochowska] In Europe there is a tendency to "Americanize" the party, i.e., to abandon programs with an all-encompassing ideology in favor of parties which are spokesmen for private group interests and practical solutions for current social problems. Will this process likewise take place in Poland and will it be an opportunity for small parties?

[Wojtaszczyk] That phenomenon, which is actually in evidence in Western Europe, has not yet reached us. In stabilized democracies, two tendencies occur in the development of political parties. On the one hand, their programs are very pragmatic. However, if we surveyed the ideological assumptions of a given party, then without looking at its name, we might join it.

[Grochowska] In other words, have they become universalized?

[Wojtaszczyk] Yes. On the other hand, populism and wishful thinking dominate in the slogans of our parties. Their programs do not point out paths but the material means by which, under conditions of a market economy and parliamentary democracy, these plans may be realized. Polish parties are only apparently similar to Western parties. Like Western parties, they appeal to all of society, but this is a proof of their helplessness. For, unlike Western parties, they have not yet passed through the stage of articulating and representing concrete interests. Thus, we have a social base and, as if alongside this base, political parties which do not fit into any of the traditional ideological directions. It is impossible to identify them at a specific point of the party spectrum: on the left, in the center, or at the right.

[Grochowska] The example of Party X proves that under favorable conditions, if we strike at a sensitive point of society's sensibility, the effects of populist slogans are astounding. Thus, can small parties endanger the stability of the political system?

[Wojtaszczyk] I believe that would be possible if small parties succeeded in creating identities that would compensate for the weaknesses of these parties. I believe that despite the confusion, society is behaving rationally and will not give them its support. This does not mean that these parties play no role. They can and do garner society's dissatisfaction; they can emphasize these moods and take advantage of them.

[Grochowska] What will be the future of small parties? Will they disappear?

[Wojtaszczyk] The experience of states in which the socioeconomic system has undergone a radical transformation shows that the political scene was set in order there over several years. In Poland, parties are arising as a reaction to a constantly changing situation. I believe that as the situation stabilizes, small parties will not find a place in major policy and they will shift their activity to the level of interest groups. Meanwhile, if the situation worsens, populist parties will develop. This phenomenon may be related to a departure from democracy and to the development of authoritarian tendencies.

**Military Survey on Changing Political Scene**

92EP0510A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish  
No 23, 6 Jun 92 p 7

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk, holder of a doctorate in philosophy and commander of the Army Institute for Sociological Research, by Marek Henzler; place and date not given: "Moods Within the Army"]

[Text] [Henzler] Information about the army's morale and moods within it has been until recently one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Polish People's Army. Today, when the army has ceased to be "people's," we constantly read alarming reports about the state of our armed forces. Is it really that bad?

[Kolodziejczyk] A lot of information about the moods in the army is surfacing nowadays. It is a fashionable topic. It is regrettable, however, that sensational stories are prevalent. But the moods are bad indeed. Negative feelings predominate in opinions with regard to the various aspects of the functioning of the army units, logistical support, quality of armament and equipment, living conditions of the officers and the troops, etc. In contrast, opinions with regard to people, command efficiency and social relations in the army are different. In this case, positive feelings outweigh the negative ones.

[Henzler] The system of studying moods within the army is quite elaborate. There are military information services as well as reports of commanders and pedagogical officers. There are also military chaplains. What is the WIBS [Army Institute for Sociological Research] position in this system?

[Kolodziejczyk] I do not think that the major task of the military information services is studying moods within the army. Neither do I think it is the main function of the military chaplains. It is the dominant, although not the primary, sphere of the Institute's interests. WIBS was established in September 1990. It is a scientific research and development center and, at the same time, a military unit, remaining at the disposal of the army command in peace or war. We are directly subordinated to the defense minister through the chief of the Education Department and the deputy minister for military training.

[Henzler] Who receives your reports and papers?

[Kolodziejczyk] The deputy minister for national defense in charge of military training, who then decides about their further distribution. They are usually delivered to the president's Chancellery and the National Security Office, the Sejm's national defense commission, the leadership of MON [Ministry of National Defense] (the minister, deputy ministries, chief of the General Staff, the field bishop, and sometimes the chiefs of the MON's central institutions). Occasionally, the chiefs of the military districts and branches of the armed forces receive those reports as well. The reports are a result of periodical surveys, conducted monthly or biyearly for example, and commissioned surveys. An example of the latter was a survey on the military community's reception of John Paul II's last pilgrimage to his homeland and his meeting with the military in Zgierz Pomorski.

[Henzler] Has the Institute been ordered to conduct a survey of the army's attitude toward the conflict surrounding the former Minister of Defense Jan Parys?

[Kolodziejczyk] No. Nobody has ordered such a survey nor we have initiated it, because a large part of the professional military cadre avoids giving answers to questions with political overtones.

[Henzler] Even if anonymity is guaranteed?

[Kolodziejczyk] Yes. Despite the fact that we are particularly sensitive on the issue of providing anonymity. Otherwise it would be impossible to conduct any objective research in such a hierarchical institution as the army. Some aspects of Minister Parys' case (for example, the issue of the competence of civilian agencies to control the army) will be revealed by our May survey, but we will not know its results until June.

[Henzler] What good is it to provide the policy makers with results of a survey about the most sensational—as far as the public is concerned—affair relating to the military two months after Minister Parys' speech at the General Staff?

[Kolodziejczyk] The essence of Minister Parys' case is the model of civilian control over the army. This problem, despite the findings of the government and Sejm commissions, still remains to be solved and we will study this issue continuously. As far as the pace of our research is concerned, it is not so bad, given our numerically limited staff. The Institute employs 16 people, including 13 researchers. As recently as a year ago, the basic tool of a military sociologist was a calculator. Later I brought in my personal computer. Today we have two office-supplied computers and two private ones. We had to pitch in our private money in order to capitalize on the opportunity provided by contacts with the West. We needed to match its standards of scientific research, at least at the basic level. Just recently we were promised computer equipment purchased with funds from the General Staff and the Scientific Research Committee. And these are not the only impediments to the Institute's work.

There is only a handful of military sociologists in Poland, due the scientific community's prejudice toward the military field. The Germans have this problem as well, as we have learned through our contacts with the Bundeswehr Social-Scientific Institute in Munich. The civilian communities have escaped into so-called peace research.

[Henzler] Let's leave aside the Institute's difficulties and talk about the picture of the army, drawn on the basis of your reports. Is the army truly apolitical? Whom does the officer corps, almost all of which belonged to the party only two years ago, favor today?

[Kolodziejczyk] As I mentioned before, the first impression which one gets in the process of this research is that of the cadre's reluctance to declare any political sympathies. Almost half of those surveyed did not answer questions like that at all, which does not mean that they do not have any political opinions. On the other hand, those who did reveal them are very differentiated politically and are constantly searching for political options which would suit them the best. Following a period of domination by the former PZPR [the Polish United Workers Party, the communist party], in July 1991, 20 percent of the professional military placed its



trust in the Polish Beer Lovers Party [PPPP]. Last December, PPPP's supporters decreased significantly, and the parties for whom most preference was expressed were UD [Democratic Union], SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], and KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland]. They were followed by KLD [Liberal Democratic Congress], Solidarity, and PC [Center Accord]. We conducted such research on order of our superiors. I think that one has to be very cautious while evaluating research of political opinions. We have noticed a preeminent aversion toward making political declarations and toward dragging the army into politics.

[Henzler] Last fall, WBS studied the degree of the cadre's acceptance of the proposed changes in the army. Seventy-three percent of those surveyed approved the movement to depoliticize the armed forces, while 55 percent supported a civilian minister of defense (whose name or record were then still unknown). Now, half a year later, in the final days of the Parys incident, what would be the cadre's attitude toward the changes which have taken place?

[Kolodziejczyk] I still expect them to accept the course of changes in the army.

[Henzler] The current, civilian leadership of MON is clearly in favor of a pro-NATO character of our alliances. Has that military option met with understanding in the army itself?

[Kolodziejczyk] We surveyed the issue of military options in July and December of last year. In between these surveys, there was the coup attempt in the USSR, which quite significantly influenced the change of our military's opinions. Before the coup, the largest number of those surveyed—32 percent—thought that Poland should be a non-allied, neutral country. Last December, only 21 percent supported that option, whereas the most popular was a view that Poland should make its own security arrangements through bilateral agreements with its neighbors (37 percent of those surveyed supported this view, compared to 27 percent in July).

The pro-NATO option was in third place in both surveys, but the number of its proponents has increased from 19 to 23 percent. The least popular option was the idea that Poland ought to initiate a new military alliance with the states of Central Eastern Europe (15 and 16 percent of opinions in July and December, respectively).

The research results concerning security threats to Europe until the year 2000 also proved interesting. Undoubtedly, the perils stemming from the collapse of the USSR were put at the top of the list. Eighty-three percent of the cadre thought that the danger rooted in that situation would increase, whereas only eight percent thought to the contrary. In addition, they pointed out the following sources of risk—mass immigration from other countries, national conflicts in Europe, nuclear blackmail by the Third World countries, terrorism, etc.

[Henzler] For the past few years the army has been undergoing major changes, such as restructuring and the removal of the party organization. Military personnel, together with the rest of our citizens, is feeling the effects of our internal crisis. How has this influenced their opinions with regard to the country's security and defense?

[Kolodziejczyk] According to our surveys, 92 percent of the cadre expect a special parliamentary debate devoted to the problems of the armed forces. The Sejm has to finally decide on a few major issues—the shape of our defense policy, the army's role and place within the state, a meaningful military budget, and the new status of the professional soldier. Only a few percent of those surveyed supported the idea that the representatives should tackle the problem of our defense industry (after the experiences of the Gulf war, our military's interest in the Polish defense industry has decreased). Similarly, only a few are interested in opening a debate about clericalization of the army. This issue has not been so far a source of controversy in the army.

[Henzler] The so-called Association of Junior Officers for the Reform in the Military, among others, has distributed various proclamations and leaflets within the army in recent weeks. Is Poland facing a "mutiny" of lieutenants?

[Kolodziejczyk] I know this affair only from rumors, but I know that it has had a broader scope. I like the MON's reaction in this instance. In my opinion, the future belongs to young lieutenants. Sooner or later some of them will reach positions and ranks of generals. However, I am not in favor of their getting there by shortcuts. When I myself was a lieutenant, I was mostly interested in service and in studying. I regret that I did not have such opportunities to master my qualifications and to see the world and other armies as today's junior officers have.

[Henzler] Thank you for the interview.

### Crisis in Privatization Ministry Explored

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[Article by Ada Kostrz-Kostecka including interviews with the assistant director of the Capital Privatization Department, Jacek Klinowski, who resigned from the ministry, and the director of the Reprivatization Department, Narcyz Hofman, who has withdrawn his resignation; places and dates of interviews not given: "A Storm in the Ministry"]

[Text] A couple of days ago, at their own request, four directors and assistant directors of departments left the Ministry of Privatization, and two others are preparing to leave. All in all, an eight-person group of directors declared their intention to leave by going, late in April, to the head of the ministry with a letter in which the shortcomings in the functioning of the ministry are discussed. It may be that now, after the government has been dismissed, those resigning will change their mind.

It was primarily a matter of the ministry's concentration on political factors in making decisions, while omitting the substantive and pragmatic elements, lack of a clear division of responsibility among the members of the ministry's leadership, lack of an organizational structure, lack of cooperation between departments, inefficiency, lack of respect for the law in making decisions, and ineffectiveness in enforcing decisions. In addition to the comments pertaining to work organization, the lack of a privatization strategy and policy, or the concept of an approach to foreign investments, were mentioned.

That this is the situation in the Privatization Ministry is also revealed by the fact that the privatization processes in some

cases (e.g., in the electronics industry), have slowed down and sometimes come to a halt.

What is happening in this ministry and what kind of effect can it have on ownership transformation? I asked two people for interviews—the assistant director of the Capital Privatization Department, Jacek Klinowski, who resigned from the ministry, and the director of the Reprivatization Department, Narcyz Hofman, who has withdrawn his resignation.

### Sectors Are Waiting for Restructurization

[Klinowski] I have been working in privatization from the beginning. I remember that the attitudes towards it differed. Minister Lewandowski, initially, also approached privatization of capital with distrust, but later he was persuaded. Except that he did not begin by criticizing the existing state of affairs, as did Minister Gruszecki. I believe that this is what is now slowing down decisions, because it is hard for someone to decide on something that he totally criticized at the beginning, and now it has turned out that there is no other way.

I will not talk about personal characteristics, because there are people who are not afraid to make decisions and take responsibility, and there are also those who have to think for a long time. Naturally, mistakes were made, but they were always the function of the number of decisions made. We do not know what will happen with privatization. We do not know what will happen with the ministry, because it is practically in a state of liquidation, except that there is no liquidator.

If we are to privatize, then we must be given the ability to do so. We cannot sanction something that is not being done. Attempts were made to accuse our group of trying to make a political statement, and that is not true. Such a charge could only originate in the minds of a politicized leadership, which knows no other criteria.

[Kostrz-Kostecka] A lot of money went for sector studies, which you were in charge of. What is happening with them now?

[Klinowski] Was it really a lot? If the studies, which make it possible to lay out an industrial policy for the entire sector, cost as much as the daily salary of the administrative employees in that sector, is that a lot or is it a little? Naturally, in the ministry's budget this is a large sum, especially since we are expending money, and the receipts are flowing directly into the budget.

The sector studies were linked to a certain privatization policy. In studying a given sector, it turned out, for example, that a few enterprises are in good condition and foreigners might buy them, and the rest are in poor condition. The sale of these few enterprises is begun, but their appeal is not in the value of the property, but in the piece of the market which they are occupying now and will occupy in the future. We negotiate a price and receipts flow into the budget, but we silently assume that the rest will be liquidated, because this seems to raise the value of those that are being sold. But if we assume that this constantly hungry budget will only eat up the money, then in five or six years it will still be hungry, and we will no longer have anything to sell, and this is a serious threat to privatization.

That is what the situation is from the standpoint of the interests of the budget, and now let us look at it from the standpoint of the interests of the state treasury. Actually, there is no sector which does not have to be restructured on a small scale, i.e., on the enterprise level, while the entire sector has to be restructured on a large scale. The Privatization Ministry's function is to restructure enterprises on the assumption that a market is being created. In other words, to make these enterprises begin to function, on the assumption that industry will be temporarily protected and know-how and technologies will be obtained.

The transition from sector analysis to sector restructuring should be a natural procedure. Frequently enterprises need large investments, and then it is hard to talk about receipts in the initial period. It should also be assumed that there will be regulations which favor foreign capital, if we expect to get it. And yet the lack of a consistent policy in regard to foreign investment means that investors are beginning to wonder whether they should come here.

[Kostrz-Kotecki] You became assistant director during Minister Gruszecki's term of service. Why did you decide to leave the ministry now?

[Klinowski] I became assistant director because this position did not exist in the department previously. If the present leadership feels that we must end the functioning of this department as a task force and create bureaucratic organizations, they should divide the responsibility among themselves, and I undertook this responsibility. The appointment of a titular director, who had no duties or responsibilities, created a strange situation. Official channels required that an employee go to his director, who in turn went to his minister—in this case, the under secretary of state—who in turn went to the secretary of state, and he in turn to the director of the office.

In this hierarchy the most important element was lost—the decisionmaking. Previously, as an independent employee, I dropped in on the deputy minister, Jacek Siwicki, at any hour of the day or night, because that is how we worked, and obtained, after a short or long discussion, a decision. And the enterprises, as well as the investors who, for example, obtained credit to purchase an enterprise, are waiting for us to make these decisions, and time is important to them.

I left because no one was able to make a decision that was basic for privatization, whether we are guided by the interests of the budget or the state treasury. Decisions are not being made here, and after a certain time someone says to me: there were sector studies, we put a lot of money into them, and how were they used? It seems to me that I no longer have the clout and must protest in some way, and most of all I must stop sanctioning the present stagnation in privatization.

### Burning Matters

[Hofman] I do not know how an inside matter of the ministry reached the press. Ownership transformations are something new and the criticism, which grows as time passes, can be explained, in part, by the fact that these processes are not understood, and that sometimes what has been happening here has not been correctly interpreted. Although, of course, we all make mistakes.

I am one of the eight directors who went to the leadership of the ministry with the letter, because many things need to be improved. First of all, the organizational matters. Decisions have to be made quickly, especially in capital privatization and in legal matters. A better informational policy is also essential.

[Kostrz-Kotecki] We know that there are differences of opinion on the subject of reprivatization between you and deputy minister Janusz Krzyzewski, who is in charge of reprivatization.

[Hofman] There are differences between us, particularly as to the method by which claims will be settled. We must, absolutely, settle the beyond-the-Bug River issue, because it represents the largest percentage of claims. I believe that we should focus our attention only on those cases in which violations of the law occurred, because no one has questioned nationalization or agricultural reform. At the present time, these differences in opinions have helped the law, because the work on it has been accelerated.

[Kostrz-Kotecka] Why, then, did you want to leave the ministry?

[Hofman] I decided to leave because I believe that we must discuss matters of substance and not go into other subjects, particularly political. After a conversation with the leadership, my resignation was not accepted and it was decided that the matter should be postponed for a few weeks or months until the law on reprivatization is passed.

I also believe that many conclusions were drawn from this conversation. The inner circle of the leadership was summoned, the tasks of certain sections were precisely defined, and the information policy was changed. But we still do not know what the fate of the ministry will be, which ministry will be in charge of privatization and reprivatization. As a result, people are leaving and it is not surprising because everyone has a family and cannot live in a state of uncertainty.

I believe that the climate surrounding reprivatization and other ownership transformations should be changed. They must be separated from politics and the decisions must be strictly economic and legal. We must see to it that the law on reprivatization is passed by the Sejm. We must regulate ownership matters and we must satisfy the several thousand citizens who could become owners using their own capital.

Nor is the matter of wages in the ministry unimportant. Recently four people left my department. They obtained higher paying jobs, but we lost professionals whom we had already trained.

Of the eight directors and assistant directors who signed the letter, four resigned, and that is too bad because they were primarily the people who were engaged in legal matters of capital privatization. Those who remained are functioning just as I am, with the hope that there will be changes in the ministry that will allow them to stay. One may not be a director, but one must know how to defend his views and be his own man in every situation.

### Peasant Party's Economic Program Examined

92EP0506A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 7 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Polish Peasant Party's Program: Liberalism With a Human Face"]

[Text] The PSL (Polish Peasant Party) is one of the few political parties that from the beginnings of the market economy in Poland had its own original program. Miroslaw Pietrewicz, Wladyslaw Szymanski, and Jozef Zegar can be called its main authors, although a couple of other people also made a smaller contribution to it.

The people who do not like the Peasant Party say that the originality of its economic concepts boil down to Tuwim's (or was it Slonimski's) well-known saying in which he praises the Phoenicians for inventing money, but at the same time blames them for inventing so little of it. This comparison quite aptly describes PSL's relationship to the so-called Balcerowicz program: The peasant activists liked its market orientation but resented it because its implementation caused a general crisis in sales and a steadily shrinking domestic demand.

In their diagnosis of the present state of the Polish economy, the authors of the PSL program call attention to a few more perils. These are, in sequence:

- The financial disaster affecting enterprises (in January and February 1992, gross profits amounted to scarcely 2.9 percent).
- The holdups in payments, which now total almost 300 thousand billion zlotys [Z].
- The budget deficit, which, according to the economists connected with PSL, will be Z35 thousand billion higher than the government had anticipated.
- The breakdown in the trade and payments balance, which threatens to undermine the convertibility of money.
- The high open and hidden unemployment, totaling approximately 4.9 million people.
- The disastrous reduction in the use of artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and qualified sowing materials, which may make it necessary to import cereals as early as this fall.

According to PSL, neither budgetary nor monetary policy can eliminate these perils, and the economic policy is not an antirecessionary policy. It does not take into account either the market paralysis caused by the sales crisis and the inordinate opening of the border for consumer-goods import, or the breakdown in the enterprises' financial system. A "creative destruction" strategy prevails in the economy, which has turned out to be a scorched-earth philosophy. Under Polish conditions it is untenable because it is not accompanied by an adequate inflow of capital.

According to the authors of the PSL program, the crisis was caused by the arbitrary and excessive reduction of the inflow of money, made in 1990. It ensured a balance at a very low level of utilization of manufacturing capacity. This mistake has to be corrected immediately. Two and one-half million hidden unemployed must be replaced with people who are really working and not openly unemployed.



The proposals that the government has made heretofore will not lead the economy out of its self-propelled destruction. Cuts in expenditures and the excessive tilt towards fiscal policy are leading to an ever deeper financial collapse. A new catastrophic recession is possible. We are threatened with an avalanche of bankruptcies and with disaster, not just economic but sociopolitical also.

In this situation, PSL proposes that action be taken to stimulate demand. This, in turn, may result in multiplier effects which will express themselves in growth of production, growth of earnings, and further growth of demand. First of all, investment demand should be created. But growth of domestic demand should be accompanied by:

- Greater protection of the domestic market.
- Corrections in the influence brought to bear on state enterprises.
- Additional anti-inflationary measures.

After the election of Waldemar Pawlak, PSL president, to the post of prime minister, there will be many opportunities to present its economic program in greater detail. Today we are simply underscoring the fact that according to PSL activists, this program fits into the so-called liberal option and does not raze the foundations of the market economy. It simply gives more consideration to the domestic economic realities and the social moods and expectations. In other words, PSL does not repudiate the principles of liberalism, but it would like it to be "liberalism with a human face."

### Conditions of Mining, Coal Industry Reviewed

92EP0497A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 20 May 92 p V

[Article by Anna Wielopolska: "Black Forecasts for Black Coal?"]

[Text] Beginning in April 1992, subsidies on hard coal mining were removed. The marketization of this branch of the economy, postulated for a long time, is slowly becoming a fact. In addition to the discontinuance of subsidies, an open-price mechanism has been introduced and there has been a gradual removal of barriers to trade, which will become completely independent when export limits are finally lifted.

Under present conditions, Polish mining is experiencing a drastic financial breakdown. This has an impact on the moods of the miners, who fear for the continued existence of the mines. Increasingly questions arise as to whether it would not be better for the country to import coal. It would be well, therefore, to take a look at what the situation in Polish hard coal mining really looks like—with what capital, capacities, and problems it is entering into the new economic reality.

The data presented below come from the statistics of the Main Customs Office and the State Hard Coal Agency and cover the year 1991.

### Less and Less Coal

Contrary to the upward tendency of hard coal extraction throughout the world, for several years the exact opposite process is apparent in Poland. While world production rose from 2.7 billion metric tons to 3.6 billion tons, in Poland it

dropped almost 30 percent. From approximately 200 million tons extracted in the mid-1980's, it fell to only slightly over 140 million tons last year. Along with the economic recession of the last three years, the global consumption of hard coal also dropped, although the figures for last year indicate a small rise. In 1990, while a total of 47,736 million tons of coal was mined, 119,226 million tons was consumed. However, last year, despite a drop in extraction to 141,177 million tons of coal, its consumption rose by almost 2 million tons (a total of 121,720 million tons). In the consumption statistics of all materials (fuels, electric energy) hard coal (together with coke and semicoke) continues to be in first place, remaining the basic raw material for the power industry.

Of the 70 mines in Poland, those which are the largest from the standpoint of coal extraction, are Ziemowit, with 6,733 million tons, and Piast, with 6,281 million tons. The third one, Staszic, mined 4 million tons last year, and the next 12 mined between 3 and 4 million tons. Most of the mines (43 of them) extract an average of 1 to 3 million tons, and a relatively large percentage (12) mine less than 1 million tons of coal a year, of which three in the Walbrzych region—Walbrzych, Victoria, and Thorex—which, for the past 18 months are in a state of liquidation, mine fewer than 0.5 million tons.

### Less and Less Efficiently

In the light of the world parameters for coal extraction, the above figures very clearly attest to the inefficiency of Polish mining. Compared with this same branch of the economy in highly developed countries, we are really extracting a great deal, but inefficiently. For example, the English mining industry consists of 59 mines, which last year produced 70 million tons (a reduction in exploitation is due to a restructuring program), but extraction from one well produces as much as 16,000 tons of coal daily, while 4,000 tons in Polish mines is considered to be very good. But these are relatively recent achievements: The average extraction from one well for all mines in Poland last year was less than 1,000 tons. The direct cause of this state of affairs is primarily the use of old methods, lagging far behind those applied throughout the world. This is the price our country is paying for having been cut off from the technical innovations of Western science during the 1980's, and now the lack of funds for investment.

The economic balance statement tells even more about the inefficiency of Polish mines. Last year only 14 mines showed a profit from sales of coal, while 56 closed out the year on the minus side. But this does not in the least mean that these 14 mines are actually maintaining themselves without outside help. Only in half of them did the yield from coal sales exceed the size of the subsidy granted them. Therefore, only seven of them showed a profit, the largest of which was shown in Zofiowka mine (116.1 billion zlotys [Z]), the others showed a negative balance.

### Infamous Subsidies

The total amount of income, i.e., sales plus subsidies, in 1991 was 247,726.8 billion. However, extraction cost 246,129 billion. The state subsidy in 1991 was 25,899.9 billion; for comparison, in 1990 it was 29.1 billion. The largest subsidies went to the following mines: Zabrze-Bieleszowice (2221.3 billion), Ziemowit (2199.8 billion),

and Bogdanka (Z179.8 billion). This does not mean that these mines are the least profitable. The indicator in this case is the unit cost of extraction of one metric ton of coal which, when presented along with the average sales price, gives a complete picture (see Table 2). The total cost of extracting one metric ton of coal in 1991 was Z313,598 thousand, and the average sales price on the domestic market was Z279,181 thousand.

We already know the effects of such a balance. The three Walbrzych mines shown to be the most inefficient—Walbrzych, Victoria, and Thorez—were the first to be put into a state of liquidation. The next two, Saturn and Sosnowiec, met the same fate at the beginning of this year, and the sixth liquidated mine turned out to be Nowa Ruda, also from the Walbrzych group. The fate of another 18 plants is being disputed. It should also be added that the cost of liquidating one mine is estimated at Z0.5-1.5 billion. The economic health of the liquidated mines is best illustrated in the comparison of the unit cost of extraction and the average sales price of one metric ton of coal.

#### Liquidation and Employment

But the liquidation process is also very costly and takes a long time. It is estimated that it costs from Z0.6 to Z1.5 billion to shut down one mine. Naturally, liquidation of a mine means a reduction in employment, which constitutes the final argument in favor of solutions such as combining mines. Furthermore, this has been done in the past; in the 1970's, this method was used as an escape from the consequences of the uneconomical management of natural resources, which was already then becoming more and more apparent. The complexes which were formed then—for example, the group of five Pstrowski mines—are also facing liquidation now.

The societal question is not without significance in these cases. The oft-repeated example of the "victimless" restructuring of the English mining industry, which faces a reduction from 59 mines to not quite 20, is unrealistic in Poland due to the meager funds available to us. The extinction of English mining is proceeding slowly, but at the same time

care is exercised to ensure employment to the miners who are losing their jobs. Every metric ton of coal extracted is still being subsidized and miners are being given high severance pay—an average of 20-25,000 pounds.

#### Employment and Productivity

Meanwhile, employment in Polish mining greatly exceeds world norms. In 1991 a total of 352,887 people worked in 70 mines, which was 16,106 fewer than the previous year. In differentiating between the work below ground and the work on the surface, two-thirds of those employed (243,739) worked below ground and the remaining 109,148 worked at above-ground areas of the plant. The size of the employment is proportional to the amount of coal extracted. The largest number of miners work in Ziemowit (6 million metric tons extracted)—10,141—and 8,921 work in Piast. If we compare both parameters with similar world norms—for example, in American mines, approximately 3,000 persons mine approximately 30 million metric tons of coal yearly—we have even more proof of how deeply the Polish mining industry has fallen. The average labor productivity of our mines fluctuates around 1,971 kg of commercial coal daily and 4,055 kg of coal output. Again, the most efficient are Ziemowit and Piast, but we should add that these are mines that are beautifully endowed by nature (the coal is accessible under relatively easy geologic and mining conditions), and also, being newer mines, have newer equipment.

An item which relates to employment: Wages, naturally, play an important part in extraction costs. In 1991 the average monthly wages in mines were Z3,061 thousand per person. The highest earnings were in Kleofas (Z3,552 thousand) and the lowest in Victoria (Z2,720 thousand) and Nowa Ruda (Z2,722 thousand). The share of wages and insurances in nonmaterial costs is, on average, two-thirds of the total. In terms of one metric ton of coal, financial outlays for wages amounted to Z47,811 in Piast, down to Z424,960 per metric ton in Victoria. In all, 16 mines are maintaining outlays at above Z100,000 per metric ton. For comparison, the average sales price for one metric ton of coal is Z236,175 in Piast and Z381,717 in Victoria (see Table 1).

Table 1  
Mines With Highest Productivity Indicator in 1991

Mine	Total Productivity <sup>1</sup>	Employment	Average Sales Price (per metric ton)	Average Wage (in thousand zlotys)
1. Piast	3,604	8,921	236,175	3,303
2. Ziemowit	3,319	10,141	241,087	3,380
3. Staszic	3,087	6,592	247,996	3,178
4. Boleslaw-Senski	2,921	4,379	198,549	3,222
5. Janina	2,701	3,532	248,039	3,610
6. Murcko	2,669	4,775	215,821	2,979
7. Wesola	2,666	6,796	219,063	3,175
8. Bogdanka	2,507	4,338	170,698	2,858
9. Kleofas	2,462	4,381	293,793	3,552
10. Jankowice	2,460	6,812	248,825	3,015

<sup>1</sup> in kilograms of commercial coal per employee per day

### Export—At What Price?

Until recently it was believed quite generally that the beneficial effects of export would save the Polish mining industry. That is only half true. On the one hand, reductions in export limits conflict with the application of a free market mechanism. On the other hand, the worldwide tendency to use refined fuels (petroleum and gas) has shrunk our ability to export coal. Over a period of two years—1990 and 1991—a one-third drop in the amount of coal sold on foreign markets has been recorded. Insofar as amounts are concerned, 28,065 million metric tons of coal was exported in 1990, while the past year was closed out at 19,430 million metric tons. It should be added that at present the price of coal sold abroad is much lower than the average world prices (relatively Z307,000 and approximately Z406,000 per metric ton). In 1991 we exported approximately 15 percent of the total sold amount of coal. Aside from the basic reason, which is the need to meet the competition, the

mines themselves have an influence on this state of affairs. They effectively compete with each other on the foreign markets, even to the point of exceeding the dumping limit in setting their prices. These cases are more and more frequent, which ultimately have a negative impact on the ability to enter into contracts. For a long time there has been talk about removing the limits which block exports, but without results. Some hope is being placed in the recent decision of the Ministry of Industry and Trade regarding procurement, by Polish Electric Power Network S.A., of coal in amounts that would guarantee Poland's power safety. Maybe the surpluses will be designated for export.

A factor which helps to determine the amount and price of our coal is its relatively low quality. The average calorific value of coal extracted in 1991 was 23,572 kJ/kg [kilojoule/kilogram]. The best coal, from this standpoint, comes from Moszczenica mine—approximately 30,000 kJ/kg—and the poorest, calorifically, comes from Jaworzno, Jan Kanty, and Siersza. (See Table 2.)

Table 2  
Mines Extracting Highest Quality Coal

Mines	Average Calorific Value (kJ/kg)	Yield From Export (billion slotys)	Unit Cost of Sold Coal (slotys/metric ton)	Average Sales Price (slotys/metric ton)	Average Output (metric tons)
1. Gliwice	30,359	0.0	528,946	440,751	1,141,000
2. Moszczenica	29,973	2.0	430,070	420,367	1,913,000
3. Thorez	28,708	0.0	865,353	410,559	279,954
4. Zofiowka	28,702	5.2	369,719	420,582	2,798,400
5. 1st of May	28,558	13.7	420,550	387,635	1,744,180
6. Jastrzbie	28,553	16.5	398,258	354,104	2,041,800
7. Walbrzych	28,295	0.0	825,773	390,558	386,138
8. Morcinek	28,210	4.0	592,076	402,251	839,450
9. Polska	28,121	1.7	335,852	385,789	1,017,131
10. Victoria	28,096	0.0	1,191,794	381,717	236,500

### The Last Word Belongs to the Ecologists

A comparison of the above data attests to the profitability of the mines. To make the economic picture of the Polish hard coal mining industry complete, we should add the size of the outlays to protect the environment—which is still neglected and left without funds. The ones that have the heaviest obligations are Ziemowit, Piast, and Cieczott, because they pump out the most salty

waters. The notions that this salt can be accumulated in salt mines [as published] indicates the helplessness in the face of the problem, and its size. But the mines do not pay the fines imposed on them for pollution. Because if, for example, the already oft-cited for its excellent performance Piast mine paid a Z470 billion fine, the mine would turn out to be so unprofitable that it would have to be put into liquidation immediately.



**Rights of Hungarians in Romania Discussed**

92BA1089A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 10-11 Jun 92

[Interview in two installments with Gyorgy Frunda, representative of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, by Irinel Radulescu; place and date of interview not given: "Simple Translation Errors"]

[10 Jun p 3]

[Text] [Radulescu] On several occasions, UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; RMDSZ in Hungarian] members have voiced positions using the terms "territorial autonomy" or "cultural autonomy" as claims of the Hungarian minority. Could you define these concepts and their implications?

[Fruna] UDMR has not publicly formulated—and I have no knowledge of any of the Union's officers having done so—the idea of territorial autonomy....

[Radulescu] How about the action initiated by Katona Adam at Lutita?

[Fruna] In one week, Mr. Katona established the so-called Szeckler segment of the UDMR (the translation may not be good), which in fact does not exist. He gathered five people together and made that statement, which in my opinion is a diversion. I don't know for whom and how Katona worked, but when the UDMR representatives and senators went to that area, it appeared that he had not discussed the matter with anyone. It was not the wish of the local population and is in fact a mistake. The autonomy of two and a half counties, as the Mures Hungarian Autonomous Region once was, would not solve the problem of the Hungarian minority in Romania. More than half of the Hungarians in Romania live in a Romanian diaspora, and solutions must be found that are viable both for the Hungarians who live in tightly knit groups, and for those who live in other counties. But with respect to the term "autonomy," I think that the exact notion used in international treaties does not exist in the Romanian language. In fact, this "autonomy," translated from German, has the sense of "autonomous exercise of local power." The people got scared and said that we want a separate parliament and government. That is not so. We have this autonomy through the local administration law, but we consider it inadequate due to the impossibility of using the mother tongue. This was also sustained in Ceausescu's Constitution, as well as during the period between the two world wars. It is thus an earned right and has never bothered anyone.

[Radulescu] After Lutita, Mr. Katona was expelled from UDMR and then readmitted in an executive position. Does this mean that UDMR approves his action?

[Fruna] Mr. Katona is not a member of UDMR's management. He is on the Union's local council in Odorhei, but not an officer. An officer is one who speaks in UDMR's name. Mr. Katona does not have that right. He can express his personal opinion, but not in the Union's name.

[Radulescu] How about the "cultural autonomy"?

[Fruna] I support this idea. Cultural autonomy is the basis of the right to a national identity, a right which is also stipulated in Romania's Constitution. National identity can be maintained only through cultural autonomy, through

one's own cultural institutions—theaters, magazines, newspapers, through the use of the mother tongue both in private and in public life, through the possibility of making decisions about problems that concern oneself, through freedom of religion. We, in Romania, are merely repeating Finland's history. Over there, if there are two Swedes in a Finnish village, both languages are compulsory. It's a normal regulation, but UDMR is not asking for this.

[Radulescu] I would prefer if you would comment on the Germans in Alsace and Lorraine, who as far as I know were assimilated by the French, and where the problem of granting rights to a minority did not even arise.

[Fruna] Over there, there were two smart men, Adenauer and de Gaulle, who reached the conclusion that it was impossible to live with constant aggression and offensiveness, and who agreed to grant all rights to both minorities on both sides of the border, so that there would no longer be reason for dissension. The great majority of the people has understood that this is the future of Romanian-Hungarian relations, which are the only ones that are normal.

[11 Jun p 3]

[Text] *In the first part of the interview, which we published yesterday, the discussion with Representative Frunda hinged on the definition of the concepts of "territorial autonomy" and "cultural autonomy" and on their implications. The definition offered by Mr. Frunda was "the autonomous exercise of local power," to which he added a personal example of the future of normal Romanian-Hungarian relations based on the German-French experience in Alsace and Lorraine.*

[Radulescu] UDMR has issued a proclamation at its recent meeting in Miercurea Ciuc. Point 3 of the proclamation asked for the rights granted to minorities in the Alba Iulia Proclamation of 1918. But that document speaks of the "people of Transylvania." What is your opinion?

[Fruna] Point Three states that all the rights recognized in Alba Iulia must also be recognized today, but updated. In 1918, it spoke of the "people of Transylvania" because the legal concept of national minority did not exist. I don't think it's useful to become entangled in editing or phrasing. We are a national minority in Romania. That document stipulated the rights of the Hungarian people to its own justice, to be represented by its own members, to use its language in the counties in which it lived. These rights, which have been recognized for Romania's minorities, must be considered as a foundation that can develop in terms of the international treaties that Romania has signed since 1918.

[Radulescu] Speaking of rights, during the Constitutional debate, Szocs Geza proposed an amendment which stipulated the collective rights of national minorities. As a jurist, how do you view this matter?

[Fruna] The notion of collective right is new and heavily discussed in international law. It was used for the first time in 1966 in the International Agreement Regarding Political and Civil Rights, whose Article 26 states: "Persons who belong to national minorities have the right that in private or with other members of their group..." This was thus an expression of a first form of collective rights. Both concepts are used in the Paris Charter of last year: the individual right of the person and the collective right of the minority.

However, the latter have not been accepted by Romania's Constitution. But it is useless to recognize the right of each of the two million Hungarians in Romania, if there is no recognition of the minority's right to act as a national minority: it means that its existence is not recognized.

[Radulescu] Do the Romanians in Hungary have the right to collective rights?

[Frunda] I am never in favor of the reciprocity principle between two countries, in this case Romania and Hungary, because one country can always criticize or improperly evaluate the right of the other. But minorities' rights must be placed in the perspective of international treaties and concrete historical situations in each country.

[Radulescu] At one point, you used the idea of "Romanian diaspora." I have also heard it used in terms of the Hungarians in Bucharest. How is this expression "understood"?

[Frunda] I feel that the expression "diaspora" is used unfortunately. I think it is a translation error. The Hungarian expression is *sorvany vidék*, which means regions where Hungarians are in the minority. This was translated into diaspora probably because no Romanian term exists. Just like the concept of "autonomy" is a translation error.

[Radulescu] Through his statements, Bishop L. Tokes has done great harm to Romania and even to UDMR. What is UDMR's opinion?

[Frunda] Mr. Tokes is a strong figure in Romania, in the Timisoara revolution. I say this because in all his statements and in all his visits abroad he has pleaded Romania's cause, and in America he has pleaded for granting the clause. Yes, indeed! But a diversion is attempted even with him, and all his statements arrive truncated in this country.

[Radulescu] If UDMR has nothing to hide and all the misunderstandings are merely due to some translation errors, don't you believe that UDMR's political men, scattered among the other parties, would have an opportunity to carry out real politics, and moreover, eliminate the suspicion that hangs over the Hungarian minority?

[Frunda] As an UDMR politician, I try to protect the Hungarian minority and democracy, because I cannot separate them from each other. UDMR is not an exclusively ethnic party. The people call us the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, but that is not correct. We are the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania, and we also have Romanian members. The president of our Suceava chapter is a Romanian-born woman. UDMR is not a party in the classic sense of the word. Many Hungarians feel the need to be protected under the umbrella of our organization. They have been marginalized so often...even if they are valuable people. As long as the minority problem exists, so will UDMR. But if these rights are settled in the future...

### Role of Trade Unions in Political Arena

92BA1090A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 10 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by Traian Dobre: "Trade Unions: Strides Toward the Political Arena"]

[Text] The political life is astir once more, a sign that the elections are nearing. We are not surprised by the Iliescu-Verdet or Iliescu-C.V. Tudor alliances (they are one and the

same thing) which are surfacing in various corners of the country and which are testing the hold of extremist organizations on a disoriented electorate, fed up with lies and poverty. Even the opposition is stewing in its own juices, looking for new approaches—as if they ever had any!—which will counteract the strings pulled by the communists seeking shelter in the NSF [National Salvation Front], FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front], PSM [Socialist Labor Party], PRM [Romania Mare Party], or PUNK [Romanian National Unity Party]. But the majority is ignoring a new political force—the trade unions.

In one form or another, all the union leaders with whom we have spoken have said that their political involvement is imminent and that neutrality can no longer be considered as long as the economic situation is determined solely by political decisions. The same is true abroad, and not just since yesterday. One of the strongest unions in Denmark for instance, the Federation of Free Trade Unions in Commerce, whose leader Ole Carlsen we recently met, has cooperated with the Socialist Party for more than 100 years and remains faithful to its political credo even now, when the socialists have lost ground and find themselves in the opposition. For the time being in Romania, the participation of unionists in the political turmoil is adopting two distinct forms. One, purely formal, is manifested with "discretion," as in the case of the Federation of Unions in Preuniversity Education [FSIPR]. In the opinion of Catalin Croitoru, FSIPR leader, the political involvement of a union does not automatically mean that it engages in politics. But it is normal for unions to take into account specific features of the political situation, and to engender reactions that reflect their interests. Which means "impartially as Romanian citizens, with all the parties and with all the governments"! This may be so, except that the "discreet" form of political manifestation can lead to ambiguous expressions and to the luring of unions into definite traps. This is not the case for FSIPR, which in February sided with the Democratic Convention. But it was the case in Galati, where PSM and its allies, after reestablishing the traditional party cells in enterprises, massively seduced the workers with populist slogans and misleading promises. The Galati experiment determined PSM to expand its net in other workers' centers, and even in Bucharest, specifically, where unions do not have a clear orientation and are feeling their way, and where other political parties ignore an electoral majority.

Much clearer than this is the position of the Fratia Confederation, whose leader, Miron Mitrea, has stated that given the general confusion that is wreaking havoc among the politicians, the union movement is placed in the situation of having to create an autonomous organization to represent it in Parliament, where it must necessarily express a range of varied interests, not solely political. The present circle of power, as in the communist days, has proven to be a closed system that must be cracked in order to become viable. While political forces are (as a rule) static, a party supported by the unions is dynamic. The Alfa Cartel is on the same side of the "barricades." Dan Mocanescu, their spokesman, considers that it is the duty of the union movement to generate a trade union institution which will be an active organization and which will find a well-defined spot in the political hierarchy capable of legislative initiative.

Openly or "discreetly" the unions have thus entered the political battle, and will have a strong voice to express in the first elections. Their first step has led to two currents, a social-democratic one (Fratia) and a Christian-Democratic one (Alfa), but without forming either an ideology or a political doctrine. As a result, the unions know what they want, but don't know how and where to begin, and don't perceive the outcome of their action. At the same time, their leaders have discovered the taste of politics, a taste that is changing their own convictions.

The feeling is not unprecedented. Roman Wyborski, counselor at the Polish Embassy, was kind enough to relate the case of Solidarity. That union developed competent leaders, who, as they gained stature, became transformed into politicians; and that is how the Solidarity Political Movement came to be. Poland, just like Romania, did not have a political class in the European sense. This is exactly the class that can be created by unions which have direct contact with the masses, which know and feel the needs of the people from this immediate source; better than the parties, they can serve as genuine schooling for future politicians. But the union movement falters in every instance, so that the metamorphosis of the leader creates a new mentality, incompatible with the position of the unions.

Because of this obvious contradiction, the Polish movement, which our own people are in a rush to follow, has demonstrated its weaknesses. At the present time, Solidarity—without ideology, without doctrine, but with populist tendencies!—has broken up to form, as could be expected, a multitude of parties that are attempting to define themselves politically (Democratic Union, Catholic Electoral Action, Liberal-Democratic Congress, and others). Despite its total failure in the administration, in the fall of last year the National Commission of Solidarity Unions decided to participate again in the election with its own slates; the process is thus continuing. And there is an explanation: Either the thirst for power is too great, or the new union leaders, just like ours, ignore the sad experience of their forerunners. Here also, the unions aspire to be in parliament, and even in the government. The leaders are attracted by political life, which they understand only superficially, insofar as they were trained either under the pernicious influence of communism, or on the stage of trade union pioneering. Their entry into the political sphere can worsen the social and economic crisis, just as it happened in Poland. What is essential is to involve the parties in the union movement, and not the other way around! Not in order to hoodwink the workers or to gather electoral capital, not by creating false problems and dangers, but by adopting for solution in political platforms, vital problems in the programs of union federations or confederations. The leaders who want to become politicians can be welcomed and trained. Otherwise, amateur politics (fully experienced during the NSF government) will destroy even the little that has remained unharmed....

#### Interview With New Moldovan Ambassador to UN

92BA1103A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*  
in Romanian 12 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Tudor Pantaru, ambassador of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations, by Anca Munteanu; place and date not given: "Republic of Moldova: Crisis Exportation Substitutes for Revolution Exportation?"]

[Text] [Munteanu] Mr. Ambassador, until two weeks ago you were president of the Judicial Commission of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. Since then, you have been named extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to the United Nations, commissioned to represent the interests of Chisinau in the world assembly, at a time when this function has an exceptional priority. How do you intend to begin?

[Pantaru] I am going there with our sorrows to let the world know what is truly happening at home, since Moscow has blockaded the information across the board. Those who are abroad learn what is happening in Moldova only through Moscow, and the Russian version is therefore considered as the correct one, while others do not exist. So, in order not to completely lose the information battle, we want to make our material well known, since it is based exclusively on documents, on unquestionable facts which will be disseminated at the UN; a large portion of it consists of Russian sources, which could seem curious at first sight.

[Munteanu] Is it trustworthy?

[Pantaru] There have been moments of clarity, when the truth was written even there. As for us, we want to tell the truth to the world, not our truth or their truth, but purely and simply the truth. It is impressive fact-based material, which was also reported in Minsk, at the meeting of the European Council representatives, and then in Strasbourg. Added to it is the exact chronology, from the moment it arose, of the conflict created on the left side of the Dniester.

[Munteanu] What will follow this outline?

[Pantaru] It is possible that these realities which concern us so deeply are not correctly perceived abroad. I am referring to the fact that there are no longer many minorities in the Western countries; they have remained in East and Central Europe, and together with them, all the problems they generate at this historic moment. I would like for this human rights measure to be applied to all in the same way, but for this to happen, all those who apply it must be aware of the facts. We must therefore begin with the beginning.

[Munteanu] I cannot but ask you, because you come from an area in turmoil, how do you see the solution of the conflict that is now eating away at the Moldova beyond the Prut? What resolution will David find without having to use a stone, in order not to be vanquished by Goliath?



[Pantaru] The only solution, and in any case, the first step, is to withdraw the 14th Army from Moldova's territory.

[Munteanu] How?

[Pantaru] I think that this is one aspect in which we are not the only interested parties; Western countries, not to speak of the others, are equally interested. Let's not forget what this army means, how well it is equipped, and what a danger it represents for the continent, and that it is not a joke. This is the army of an independent nation which finds itself on the territory of another independent and sovereign nation, and is the major destabilizing factor. Any peaceful settlement of the conflict—and this is the solution we want—can begin only with its withdrawal. It is only after this is done that the law will be able to have its say again, and that it will be possible to really negotiate. But let's not forget about the enormous quantities of weapons that already exist on the left side of the Prut, and which will remain there even if the 14th Army withdraws at some time. That is why it is imperative to establish a mechanism to control and monitor these weapons. It will then become evident who wants and who doesn't want to end the conflict. The world first needs to know and then it will understand.

[Munteanu] And how could this be achieved? Because it's not enough to be right, you also must have the means to enforce it.

[Pantaru] I think that world opinion, informed and aware, will at a given point, be able to influence, to determine this. People will understand that the federalization of the Republic of Moldova...

[Munteanu] Which, at this time, the Russian foreign minister Kozirev is promoting in the Western press...

[Pantaru] Exactly. It would first of all represent a dangerous precedent for the Kremlin, which in the same way does not recognize the right to independence of the Tatars, Cecens, who live on their historic land and who according to international principles are fully entitled to this right. In exchange, they recognize this right for the people who came to Moldova immediately after Stalin's troops occupied it in 1940. But matters can be easily proven with documents, not with words. We have accounts, old documents, above and beyond the events of 50 years ago. Which is the population that wants a federation? The sovietized population, the *homo sovieticus* who has been living on our land for barely half a century. What do 50 years mean on the scale of history? The town of Tiraspol is a good example: It is a militarized, colonized town, 90 percent of whose population has been imported.

[Munteanu] How do the Romanians live in Tiraspol?

[Pantaru] It can't be said that they live. There are very few of them left, most of them having taken refuge to escape the terror.

[Munteanu] Could this be the policy of the Dniester pseudo-authorities, to chase the Romanians from their land so as to be able to later claim their own right to unoccupied land?

[Pantaru] Unfortunately, this has been their policy since the beginning, and was applied throughout the empire, but especially in Bessarabia. And it has been so because unlike the Baltic countries, where a rather significant Russian population also lives, Bessarabia was never a country that

could be annexed and engulfed into the empire; it was a province belonging to an independent country, which could still claim it at some time or other. That is why for the past 50 years, they have conducted a fierce battle of denationalization, deportation, and colonization, so that the Romanians would forget they are Romanians. And to a large extent they succeeded because they used merciless means.

[Munteanu] And the results can be seen today....

[Pantaru] Unfortunately yes. The anti-Romanian policy was diabolic, the denationalization was brutal, all of it so that the Romanian population would be completely subordinated and could no longer make any "claims."

[Munteanu] I know you as a decisive man of action, as well as a man of the younger generation. What needs to be done to repair all that has been so systematically and relentlessly damaged?

[Pantaru] We have no other avenue than to tell the truth. That is the path we must follow, so that the people, including our own Romanians, will know and fully understand what is happening at home. We currently are in the same situation as Bosnia-Herzegovina, except that the standards used for the aggressor are different, and that the reasons are also transparent. However, the differences of magnitude, position, weapon resources, including nuclear weapons and status in the Security Council, mean that the sanctions are not the same in two identical cases.

[Munteanu] We Romanians are with you in your pioneering journey, and our thoughts and wishes are that you be able to contribute even from afar to relieve the suffering at home.

### **Romanian-Moldovan Student Exchange Problems**

92BA1103B Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*  
in Romanian 11 Jun 92 p 7

[Article by Sabin Risco: "Romanian Students in Moldova"]

[Text] We have received a complaint from Mr. Sabin Risco, president of the Timisoara League for the Protection of Human Rights, which we publish in its entirety:

1. It is rumored that diplomas earned at certain higher education institutes in Chisinau by young people from this side of the Prut are not recognized in Romania. Is it only an innocent rumor or is it ill-intentioned information disseminated with premeditation? For purposes of illustration, we present the following documents:

Decision No. 226 of the RSS [Soviet Socialist Republic] Moldova, of 20 July 1990, "regarding a change in the training of specialists for foreign countries at the higher and intermediate specialized education institutes in RSS Moldova."

Decision No. 189 of 24 October 1991, of the Ministry for Science and Education of the Republic of Moldova.

2. Our students in Chisinau also encounter difficulties (as were also encountered at first by some Bessarabian students who came to study in Romania) for a number of reasons. The cost of living has increased several times and despite all our efforts in the Timisoara Chapter of the League for the Protection of Human Rights, in the Timisoara-Chisinau Cultural Society, and the efforts of some parents, our students cannot afford the new conditions and a portion of

the students have had to withdraw. Regarding the scholarships for Romanian students in the Republic of Moldova, matters stand as follows: At registration, we noted that Bucharest did not send students for the 180 scholarships granted by the Government of the Republic of Moldova and of course we hoped to become the beneficiaries of this unexpected opportunity. Unfortunately, the former minister of education, Stefan Gheorghe, refused to award those scholarships to the group of candidates selected by our associations. It would not have been a great inconvenience if these scholarships had benefitted other candidates from Romania. Except that the Ministry of Education and Science did not select candidates for the Republic of Moldova, and even one month after the start of the 1991-92 school year it did not agree that the scholarships be offered to us, thus obstructing the offer of the Republic of Moldova to integrate Romanian education on both sides of the Prut, as well as to establish many friendships and connections between the young people of the two artificially separated countries.

3. Some of the parents are very upset with our associations because, though their children have passed the winter exams with honors, they do not have the assistance of these scholarships, so that some are even forced to return to Romania. Neither our associations nor the Moldovan Ministry of Science and Education are at fault.

4. Through the parents' contributions, our associations have facilitated the closing of contracts, paying the amounts due

in accordance with the above-mentioned and other regulations, based on which the registrations were recorded according to legal provisions both in the Republic of Moldova and in Romania, and also offered an allowance of 160 rubles per month. But neither we nor the Republic of Moldova are at fault for the increase in the cost of living, of transportation, and of all services in general. One thing is clear: Any nonscholarship candidate can study in the Republic of Moldova based on a contract, paying the schooling and maintenance tax, and the diploma will be recognized in Romania.

5. The legality of sending students to the Republic of Moldova is also clear. The note sent by the Ministry of Education and Science in Bucharest to the Ministry of Education and Science in Chisinau referring to our students, stipulates that they can be registered, but without benefiting from the scholarships granted by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, since they do not qualify as students admitted through a competition organized by the Ministry. Exactly so, except that the Ministry of Education and Science in Bucharest is the main culprit for the lack of Romanian students who should have been studying in the Republic of Moldova during the 1991-92 school year. And not only that: It also refused to note that these students (122) were registered and that the 180 scholarships remained unused.

Editor's note: Perhaps those involved in establishing the conditions for Romanian students in the Republic of Moldova will give us a clear response to Mr. Risco's letter.

## Ruling Party Confident of Election Success

AU1007121092 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST  
in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by D. Djuretek: "Historic Aims Achieved"]

[Text] Zagreb—Two days ago, on the premises of N.K. Jarun [not further identified], a formal session was held of the presidency and executive committee of the central Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] to mark the third anniversary of its founding assembly. The leadership and members of the HDZ gathered last night in the same building where on 17 June 1989 the founding assembly of the HDZ (then banned by the authorities) was held under the leadership of Dr. Franjo Tudjman.

Stipe Mesic, president of the executive committee of the HDZ, reminded those present of the first days of the HDZ, when it offered its program to the Croatian people, who accepted it as their own. Based on that program, he stressed, we won the elections, and Croatia became a state, after almost 900 years. Mesic said that now the party wants more: the functioning of the legal state, development of business, change in property ownership, and integration with Europe. Based on that program, Croatia was recognized internationally, and the Croatian flag is now flying in front of the United Nations.

He stressed that such a Croatia has not been to everyone's liking, particularly not to those who wanted to keep the status quo—Yugoslavia. Stipe Mesic said that, from the moment of the founding of the HDZ, it has been clear that the party is a state-making party. "We have achieved our aims," he said, "while others have been trotting behind, but now we are facing new historic challenges. They can be solved, and the HDZ must meet them now. Many want to see us be part of history, but the HDZ is the present and the future."

### Some Had Given Up

He reminded those present that they were in the very place from which the HDZ had set off to accomplish its aims, and while certain individuals had given up in the meantime, there were many new members. But, he stressed, the most important thing is that the Croatian people have supported those aims.

"We have to improve the functioning of the legal state, and liberate every last inch of Croatia. We are taking part in the elections. The constitution obliges us to do so." He said that there are two options: Either war, or the internationalization of the problem, so that, with the help of UNPROFOR [UN Protective Force], Croatian control could be established over its whole territory. "We have opted for the latter, but if it does not prove successful, then there is the extreme one, on which we will decide when it suits us."

Josip Manolic reminded those present of the period between 17 February and 17 June 1989, that is, up to the historic assembly. He said that it was the period when the political doctrine that had ruled this region for 50 years collapsed in Europe. "We judged then," he said, "that it was the right

time for the start of political pluralism, for the formation of political parties." He said that it was a period of opposing attitudes and views on the aims to be achieved, and a period of clearing the ground for the foundation of the HDZ. He said that even then Dr. Franjo Tudjman's idea of the reconciliation of the Croatian nation was victorious. "We started with Starcevic, through Radic, then the antifascist front, and on that base we have achieved success."

"It is no coincidence that we have chosen the name Croatian Democratic Community, because we wanted to underline the fact that we wanted to become something inbetween a party and a movement, and that was the only way to assemble people around the idea of Croatian reconciliation. We said that we wanted a sovereign Republic of Croatia, and our objective was clear from the very start. We wanted to be a legal party, and we determined our policies accordingly. We did not want to an illegal or a terrorist party," Manolic said.

### We Will Be Generous

Josip Manolic spoke of the difficulties that accompanied the organization of the historic founding assembly of the HDZ, which the then authorities tried to prevent at any cost. The assembly was, nevertheless, held on 17 June 1989, and the decision to found the HDZ was made. The ensuing period was a time of merging and organizing, and a time when the HDZ membership increased by half a million.

He stressed that the HDZ was commemorating its third anniversary on the eve of the second democratic elections. "We want these elections to be democratic and just," Manolic said. "The rules of the game must be equal for all. What we have to do now is hold talks with the opposition and see what their attitude toward the elections is. There are two matters that concern the opposition: financing and public presentation in the mass media." Manolic added that all of the parties have their own publications where they can publish whatever they want, and said that the only problems that might arise involve the presentation of parties on Croatian Television. "In that respect we will also be generous, and give them as much time as possible," Manolic said, adding that he opposes financing party activities out of the state budget.

The academician Dalibor Brozovic also spoke at the formal session, saying that the HDZ has nothing to fear from the opposition in the coming elections. Vladimir Seks stated that the people have recognized the HDZ as the force to lead them toward the fulfillment of their aspirations, and that the HDZ would again have the historic foresight and meet all historic challenges. Perica Juric stressed the importance of the announcement that the HDZ delivered to the parliament, the Croatian people, and the world community on 29 November 1989, which contained the demand for Croatia's natural and historical borders. Stjepan Sulimanac, Djuro Perica, and Ivan Milas also made speeches.

The formal session concluded with the singing of the Croatian anthem, and those present paid a minute's silence homage to all those who died for the freedom of the Croatian homeland.



**Genscher on His Role in Solving Yugoslav Crisis**

92BA1134B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene  
12 Jun 92 p 12

["Excerpts" from an interview with former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by various journalists in Strasbourg, date of interview not given: "Germany Is Not a Warehouse Where Democracy Is Distributed"]

[Text] Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the guest of the first Strasbourg Club, the political debate broadcast of the newly established television station Arte, which is headquartered in Strasbourg. It is a unique media experiment: The program is broadcast simultaneously in French and German. The founders, the governments of France and Germany, thus intend to create the beginnings of a future European television channel, which will emphasize cultural and educational broadcasts.

Reporters from four European newspapers—the Rome daily REPUBBLICA, the Hamburg weekly DIE ZEIT, the Paris daily LE MONDE, and Dusan Reljic from the Belgrade weekly VREME—spoke with the head of the German foreign service, who just resigned from that position a few weeks ago. The author and head of the Strasbourg Club is French journalist Luc Rosenzweig.

We are summarizing the part of the one-hour interview that applies to Genscher's role in the Yugoslav crisis.

VREME: Mr. Genscher, you expressed a desire to have Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic brought before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Many people in Serbia would not have anything against that idea, but they would also like to see other chauvinistic leaders, for example Tudjman and Izetbegovic, on the defendants' bench as well. I think that I also represent the opinion of many people in Yugoslavia who would also accuse you, because they think that you put out the fire with gasoline. When you look at television pictures from Yugoslavia in the evening, does it seem to you that your policy bore the fruit that you wanted?

Genscher: Above all, the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] attacked the Slovene people when it wanted to become independent. We Germans achieved unity again on the basis of the right to self-determination. We cannot underestimate other peoples' right to self-determination. If the Slovenes want to have their own state, no army has a right to deny them that. The JNA attacked Slovenia, then it attacked Croatia, and now it is attacking Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not the Germans who are doing it, but rather the JNA. We can have different opinions about the independence of these peoples, but those who think that today political disagreements can be settled by weapons are wrong.

I did not demand that any of those you mentioned be brought before the International Court. In some other context, I said that I was convinced that peace could be established only on the basis of respect for international law, human rights, the rights of minorities, and the right to self-determination. The UN finally has to gather its strength to protect the legal order, for example by sanctions, which have just now been imposed, after a delay of several months. I added that it would be necessary to form an international

court before which those responsible for violating international law could be brought. In that context, I only cited one name: Saddam Husayn. I hope that you will not contradict me on this.

VREME: You emphasized peoples' right to self-determination. But are there two types of the right to self-determination? The commission thought that Macedonia was more qualified for independence than, for instance, Croatia. Macedonia has not yet been recognized, however. As the press has reported, at a recent meeting of EC foreign ministers in Portugal, you provided considerable support to Greek President Mitsotakis in his opposition to recognizing Macedonia's independence.

Genscher: There is no doubt that Macedonia will be recognized. In any case, Germany opened a consulate general there recently. In Lisbon, it had to do with our settling the unresolved issues between Greece and Macedonia. The most important one is the question of the border. In principle, I think that we can only ensure peace in Europe by proceeding from the fact that borders are inalterable. If we start to raise the question of borders in Europe, we will get into a bad situation. In accordance with this awareness, at the same time as the unification of Germany, we also recognized Germany's eastern border, i.e., the border between Germany and Poland.

DIE ZEIT: Sometimes you are also self-critical, Mr. Genscher. From the distance of several months, can you assess whether it was sensible and useful for you to anger your European partners so much and for the German Government to rush the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia?

Genscher: We did not rush it. We had been advocating the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in the EC ever since September. We did not take that step before 16 December, which we had agreed upon.

REPUBBLICA: Some people in Europe, however, still have criticisms that you should have postponed recognition until minority rights were fulfilled, for example in Croatia and Bosnia....

Genscher: You are only talking about certain ones, but you are not talking about the Albanians in Serbia. Why not, doesn't that interest you? Are you only interested in the rights of certain minorities?

REPUBBLICA: Of course I am interested in the rights of all minorities in all of the former Yugoslavia, including in Serbia. Minority rights have not been fulfilled everywhere, however. That is why recognition was perhaps premature.

Genscher: No, no. In Croatia, in the areas where the Serbian minority lives, there are UN units today, and Croatia has accepted this. We cannot say that the rights of the Albanians in Kosovo or of the Muslims in Bosnia are protected in the same way. At that time it was a question of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. It turned out that other states followed us. I personally think that all sorts of things could have been spared if recognition had happened earlier.

Rosenzweig: Time is running out. Belgrade's VREME has the right to the last question.

VREME: Henry Kissinger recently talked about you in NEWSWEEK, and in doing so also commented on the recognition of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

He said that you did not have any arguments, but you maneuvered adroitly. If we now read the Helsinki commission's report on Serbia and Croatia, it can be seen that human rights are being trampled everywhere. Tudjman's regime, however, obtained its own independent state by Genscher's grace!

Genscher: Germany or I personally could not make Croatia into an independent state. Would you like to deny the Croats their right to self-determination? Can you decide whether the Croats are a separate people and whether they should have their own state? Can I or anyone else here decide about this? Aren't we living in a world in which finally no one can prescribe to anyone whether he will have his own state? Only the Croats decide on this. Thank God, all states, not just Germany, decided to recognize it. You have to get used to the fact that the times when one people could prescribe another's fate have passed.

Germany, which has borne a great responsibility in the past, will today always be on the side of the law and human and minority rights. It is very important to us; that is how we view our own responsibility today. I am glad that in this sense we are in the community of European peoples.

#### FRY President Cosic Talks to Party Leaders

92BA1131A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
21 Jun 92 pp 1, 5

[Article by B. Radivojsa: "Surmounting the Crisis in Yugoslavia Through Dialogue"]

[Text] Dobrica Cosic, member of the academy and president of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], spent his first "working Saturday" continuing consultations with party leaders and deputies on the makeup of the new government and the political situation in the country.

Cosic conducted separate talks in the Chamber of the Federation in New Belgrade with Andras Agoston, president of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM], Tomislav Sekulic, deputy of a group of citizens in the Federal Assembly, and then with a five-member delegation from the SK-PJ [League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia]: Dragan Atanasovski, Dr. Dragomir Draskovic, Stevan Mirkovic, Rade Lakusic, and Ratko Krsmanovic, as well as with representatives of the People's Party [NS] Milan Paroski and Dragoslav Petrovic.

In all these conversations, so these party leaders have informed newsmen, Dobrica Cosic emphasized the importance of the common national interest, democratic dialogue, and the rallying of all forces necessary to surmount the crisis.

#### Secession Precluded

The president's first guest, Andras Agoston, declared after the meeting that he was "extremely honored to have been called in by the president."

"I am happy to say that Mr. Cosic attributes very great importance to issues related to the position of ethnic minorities," the leader of Vojvodina Hungarians said, adding that the DZVM is above all a special-interest organization which "is mindful of the general interest, but also the ethnic interest."

"I expounded our concept of autonomy and pointed out that that concept precludes secessionism," Agoston emphasized. Incidentally, it has been agreed that Dobrica Cosic's talks with representatives of the DZVM will continue in the future.

Tomislav Sekulic, the independent deputy with whom the president spoke next, said that in connection with the candidate for prime minister and the makeup of the new government Cosic expressed a firm position that the national interest is above everything and that he will be guided primarily by that. Sekulic, incidentally, is a deputy from Kosovo, and yesterday's talks also touched upon the Albanian ethnic minority.

It was observed that contacts should be made as soon as possible with political representatives of the Albanians, but that the meeting should also be well prepared. At present, that deputy explained, certain other prospects have priority, above all formation of the government, and after that it is realistic to expect talks with the Albanians.

Sekulic said concerning Cosic's election as president that "we could not have found a better builder than Mr. Cosic" for the ties that have been severed in the country and the bridges to the world that have been demolished.

Stevan Mirkovic expressed a similar belief on behalf of the SK-PJ. When he was elected, I said that we should have a younger president, but after today's conversation and the freshness of the ideas about what should be done in Yugoslavia, I am convinced that we now have a man who can bring together all the political options in Yugoslavia. I was also afraid, Mirkovic said, that we would have a president who is only a Serb, but it is clear that Yugoslavia is headed by a Yugoslav.

In their conversation with Cosic, representatives of the SK-PJ favored picking the Yugoslav prime minister from Montenegro so as not, as Dragan Atanasovski put it, to "plant a seed of discord." They did not say whether the president took a specific position on this, although he told the representatives of this movement that he is "nevertheless in favor of respecting the Constitution." Rade Lakusic, SK-PJ deputy in the Federal Assembly from Montenegro, expressed the judgment in this connection that Mr. Milan Panic, "if he is a patriot and if he so wishes," could take one of the places in the government.

Asked by newsmen for the comment of SK-PJ representatives on Cosic's statement in the present conversation about "discontinuity with the communist past," Dr. Dragomir Draskovic replied that the past cannot be reduced to discontinuity. Just imagine what would happen with states in which various parties are constantly replacing one another in the government and if each of them spoke about discontinuity.

#### Relaxation of Political Tension

Finally, representatives of the People's Party also spoke yesterday morning with President Cosic.

"This is the first time we have enjoyed this democratic gesture of being received by the president, and we are satisfied with the conversation," declared Milan Paroski,

nevertheless mentioning Cosic's statement which he did not like: "That they not be disappointed if he does not meet all of their expectations."

Paroski noted that Cosic's election has reduced the political tension, that people are breathing easier, but that now he must form a national unity government. If such a government is formed, the NS is prepared to take part in it.

This party proposed to Dobrica Cosic that when the federal government is formed the date of the new elections also be fixed, so that, as noted by Dragoslav Petrovic, the government and assembly would be provisional. A period of 100 days also should be fixed, according to the views of the People's Party, during which there would be a moratorium on political tensions in Serbia and Montenegro, so that the new government might get its bearings in that period.

The new elections, in the view of the NS-ites, should be held regardless of whether the sanctions are in effect or not. In the afternoon hours, President Cosic also received representatives of the People's Party of Montenegro—Novak Kilibarda, Dr. Novica Stanic, and Nikola Mestrovic. The conversation, by all appearances, focused mostly on formation of the new government and problems concerning the various nominations for prime minister. President Kilibarda of the People's Party noticed on that occasion that the Constitution uses an "unconstitutional phrase" ("as a rule"), which is now causing ambiguities.

Kilibarda says that he has the impression that the problems related to the choice of a candidate for prime minister still have not been resolved, but as far as their party is concerned, they feel that all the disagreements could be overcome through good talks. The new prime minister, say the representatives of the Montenegrin People's Party, should be chosen depending on which candidate can bring us the greatest benefit both at home and abroad. "The one who could help to overcome the hunger which is on the threshold" should have the best chance, Kilibarda remarked.

In answer to the specific newsman's question Did this mean that the People's Party, because the international factor was being mentioned, would not oppose the election of Milan Panic? Kilibarda said that Panic is not the only one who has a reputation in the world.

#### **Revelation of JA Plan To Oust Kucan, Tudjman**

92BA1134A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 20 Jun 92 p 15

[Article by Slobodan Dukic: "How the Yugoslav Army Wanted To Arrest Kucan"]

[Text] *The head of KOS [military counterintelligence service] claims that they had a plan to remove the Slovene and Croatian leaderships.*

Belgrade, 19 Jun—The military leadership of the former Yugoslavia prepared for the removal of the legally elected leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia. The details concerning these plans were described by Aleksandar Vasiljevic, a JA

[Yugoslav Army] major general and the head of its counter-intelligence service, in the latest issue of the weekly NIN.

In that interview, Vasiljevic said, among other things, that the army made a mistake when it did not remove the civilian state authorities on its own account. In response to a question about whether they had a plan to remove the leaderships in Slovenia and Croatia, he answered in the affirmative, and added that these plans were worked out in detail. Among other things, the arrest of Milan Kucan and Franjo Tudjman, along with all the other members of the highest leaderships of Slovenia and Croatia, was planned. These plans were prepared in the summer of 1990, first of all for Slovenia and Croatia.

Vasiljevic then related that to his great regret, "an attempt was discovered in military security service bodies in Slovenia to betray these strictly confidential plans to the Slovene leadership. Sergeant First Class Janez Napotnik obtained the key to a safe that was used by the head of the security service at the Ljubljana corps command. He also noticed that General Simeon Tumanov, the deputy chief of the Security Administration, and I were frequently coming to Ljubljana. By the way, at the beginning of May General Tumanov was retired just because he is a Macedonian. In short, KOS caught Sergeant First Class Napotnik in the act, and learned from him that he had been recruited for collaboration by the heads of the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs," NIN was told by Vasiljevic, who continued:

"From the very beginning, Napotnik was in direct contact with Ivan Erzen, at that time the commander of the Slovene State Security Service. At the time when we uncovered Sergeant Napotnik, Erzen was an assistant to Minister of Internal Affairs General Petar Gracanin...."

In response to a question about whether Napotnik had left traces behind him, Vasiljevic answered that the traces had been "exposed by Milan Kucan and several other Slovene political leaders. They were saying everywhere that the army was preparing a military coup. Thus, in the summer of 1990 all the leading politicians in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were obsessed with persecution. Alija Izetbegovic, for example, claimed that we were preparing to assassinate him, and consequently he never slept two nights in a row in the same bed. Of course, the Slovenes were the loudest in warning that a military coup was being prepared. This seemed suspicious to us, and consequently we rushed to Slovenia, in order to check on who was betraying the secret. We discovered Napotnik very quickly. We kept him as our greatest treasure, and through him, we regularly sent Mr. Kucan, Dolanc, Bavcar, Jansa, and others 'confidential' documents. We played a double game, through which we learned what the Slovene leaders would like to find out about the army," revealed Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic in an interview published under the title "All of KOS's Secrets."

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